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Abstract 
 
Assessing how well an individual can meet real world cognitive demands is an 
important clinical outcome, particularly for older adults. Research examining real world 
cognitive functioning has used both lab-based tasks as well as questionnaires. However, these 
assessments were limited for a number of reasons. Lab-based tasks lack personal relevance 
which may affect the strategies and amount of effort individuals apply, reducing their 
ecological validity. Questionnaires are considered more ecologically valid but require 
individuals to recall cognitive failures over weeks and months depending on an individual’s 
fallible cognitive ability to remember their mistakes over long periods of time. More recent 
research has attempted to develop methods for the daily reporting of cognitive failures but 
focus primarily on memory failures and ignore more general types of cognitive failures. 
These daily diary studies also failed to assess the impact of cognitive failures on daily 
functioning. The current study built on this previous research and introduced a set of 
assessment tools designed to capture missed activities, memory failures, and difficulties with 
attention and concentration that individuals experience on a daily basis as well as the impact 
of these events on daily functioning. One hundred thirty-one participants, 20 to 80 years old 
completed these assessments once each day for a period of seven days as well as a series of 
lab-based cognitive tasks. These data revealed that participants reported missing the most 
activities due to overload (e.g., running out of time) but found missing activities due to 
somatic complaints as the most bothersome. With regard to daily memory failures, 
participants reported equal numbers of retrospective and prospective memory failures but 
reported expecting more future consequences from prospective memory failures. Older 
participants reported experiencing more missed activities and memory failures but rated these 
    
events as less bothersome, less interfering, and as less likely to bring about future 
consequences compared with younger adults. Daily failures of attention and concentration 
were captured using a Likert-style scale that assesses cognitive interference. This 
questionnaire exhibited adequate reliability and factor structure both between- and within-
persons and tapped a construct separable from negative affect. Finally, there was evidence of 
weak relationships among self-reported cognitive failures and objective cognitive 
performance. Findings are discussed relative to previous research on self-reported cognitive 
failures, the importance of assessing other daily processes and their effects on daily cognitive 
failures, and the continued lack of relationship between self-reported cognitive failures and 
objective cognitive performance. 
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DEVELOPMENT OF A DAILY DIARY METHOD FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF 
EVERYDAY COGNITIVE FAILURES 
Overview 
 The assessment of cognitive performance outside the lab is critical to understanding 
an individual’s level of real world functioning and can be an important clinical outcome for 
researchers interested in cognitive deficits related to illness and age. Impairment in everyday 
cognitive functioning can result in significant consequences for the individual (e.g., 
forgetting to pay rent or not completing a work task on time). Although researchers have 
used different approaches to index an individual’s ability to meet real world cognitive 
demands, one approach is through the assessment of self-reported cognitive failures. 
However, self-reports of everyday cognitive failures remain limited for several reasons. First, 
self-reports of cognitive failures tend to focus on exclusively on memory failures and neglect 
other aspects of cognitive functioning. Second these assessments typically do not capture the 
impact of these failures on daily activities. Research that does examine the impact of 
everyday cognitive failures restricts assessments to failures well outside the normal range of 
functioning (e.g., problems with activities of daily living such as dressing). Consequently 
these assessments lack sensitivity to the impairment related to failures in normally 
functioning individuals. Third, many previous studies of everyday cognitive failures rely on 
retrospective self-reports that span relatively long temporal response frames (e.g., 30 days), 
which can reduce reporting accuracy and introduce bias (Cavanaugh, Feldman & Hertzog, 
1998).   
The overall objective of the proposed study is to develop a set of self-report tools for 
the daily assessment of everyday cognitive failures in a population of normally functioning 
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individuals. These new tools addressed the limitations of previous assessments in three ways. 
First, they broadened the types of cognitive failures assessed beyond memory failures: 
participants reported on any missed activities regardless of whether the reason for missing 
the activity was cognitive. Second, it included items designed to quantify the extent to which 
reported failures impact daily functioning in cognitively intact individuals. Third, it focused 
on shortening the reporting time interval to failures that occurred over the previous day.  
The proposed research used a daily diary design to assess the type, frequency and 
impact of everyday cognitive failures in a sample of community residing adults (ages 20-80) 
and addressed the following general aims. The first aim was to describe the frequency, type 
(e.g., prospective memory, retrospective memory, and overload), and impact of missed 
activities and everyday memory failures. Also, the first aim will examine the effects of age 
on these variables. The second aim was to conduct a psychometric analysis of a Likert-style 
questionnaire designed to measure lapses in attention and concentration; specifically, to 
establish its validity and reliability at both the within-person and between-person levels. The 
third aim was to investigate the relationships between self-reports of daily cognitive failures 
and objective in-lab cognitive performance.  
In the next section of this document I review the strengths and limitations of previous 
approaches to assessing everyday cognitive functioning. The review begins with a brief 
consideration of performance-based measures, followed by an in depth discussion of self-
report measures; the approach used in the current study. Finally, I address the specific aims 
of the current study and discuss hypotheses relating to each. In the methods section, I 
describe the design and measures of the research. I then describe the findings in the current 
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study as well as possible interpretations and implications. The document will conclude with a 
discussion of these findings and suggestions for future research based on the findings. 
Significance of everyday cognitive functioning 
Everyday cognitive functioning refers to an individual’s ability to meet the cognitive 
demands they face in the real world. For example, successful completion of activities such as 
balancing a checkbook, remembering to take medications, and finding one’s way to and from 
the grocery store depend upon multiple cognitive functions, such as memory, planning, and 
attention. Severe impairment in the ability to meet these demands is often used as a 
diagnostic criterion for psychological disorders (e.g., depression; Burdick, Endick, & 
Goldberg, 2005) and organic diseases (e.g., dementia; Rediess & Caine, 1996). An 
individual’s failure to meet everyday cognitive demands may affect decisions about their 
ability to live independently in old age (Royall et al., 2007) or following a traumatic head 
injury (Sveen, Mongs, Roe, Sandvik, & Bautz-Holter, 2008). A common outcome in clinical 
literature is impairment or improvement in activities of daily living; activities that require 
cognitive processes to perform (e.g., balancing a checkbook). For example, recent lab-based 
cognitive interventions examine improvement in completing activities of daily living, 
focusing particularly on older adults (e.g., Jobe et al., 2001; Willis et al., 2006). Further, 
older adults' complaints about impaired cognitive performance outside the lab are associated 
with Alzheimer’s pathology and may be present before objective cognitive tests reflect any 
impairment (Barnes, Schneider, Boyle, Bienias, & Bennett, 2006; van der Flier, 2004).  
In addition to possibly signifying underlying neurological damage, impairment in 
everyday cognitive functioning can have a range of personal consequences (Martin, 1983; 
Farias et al., 2008) and are a significant concern of older adults (Reese & Cherry, 2004). 
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Although few studies document the severity of these consequences, it is generally accepted 
that forgetting to take a medication, failing to pay attention while driving, or getting lost in an 
unfamiliar neighborhood can have a negative impact on an individual’s ability to function 
(Cohen & Conway, 2008; Kruysse 1992; Reason, 1984). Kruysse (1992) attempted to make a 
direct connection between everyday cognitive functioning and real-world consequences 
using an event-contingent diary study of cognitive failures experienced while driving. He 
found that 27% of the failures were made in situations that were considered moderately to 
very dangerous and at least one error resulted in an actual collision. However, it is still 
unclear is how often these lapses occur in other contexts and the impact on an individual’s 
daily functioning. To better understand the normative frequency of these lapses, researchers 
have used both performance-based and self-report approaches to index an individual’s level 
of everyday cognitive functioning. 
Approaches to measuring everyday cognitive functioning 
The next section briefly describes performance-based approaches to assessing 
everyday cognitive functioning. After this, the self-report approach is addressed in detail. 
Performance-based measures of everyday cognitive functioning 
One approach to measuring everyday cognitive functioning is through the use of 
performance-based assessments in the lab. Allaire and Marsiske (1999; 2002) developed and 
evaluated a battery of cognitive tasks that were based on traditional lab-based measures but 
used stimuli related to medication adherence and food preparation. They demonstrated that 
these measures had high reliability (α = .69-.88) and were significantly correlated with their 
traditional lab-based analogs (rs = .26-.74). Additionally, this battery predicted real world 
outcomes such as self-reported performance on activities of daily living (Allaire & Marsiske, 
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2002) and mortality (Weatherbee & Allaire, 2008) in a sample of older adults. Consistent 
with lab-based research using more traditional cognitive performance measures, older adults 
showed significant deficits in performance on this battery (Allaire & Marsiske, 1999). 
Another performance-based method presents individuals with real world cognitive 
demands and asks them to describe how to complete or actually perform daily tasks (Allaire 
& Marsiske, 2002; Berg, Strough, Calderone, Sansone, & Weir, 1998; Diehl, Willis, & 
Schaie, 1995). The participant-generated solutions are coded for quantity and quality. Allaire 
and Marsiske (2002) found that the quality of the solutions significantly predicted self-
reports of everyday functioning. Similarly, Allaire and Willis (2006) demonstrated that lower 
scores on their open-ended measure of everyday cognitive functioning predicted cognitive 
impairment as well as mortality even after accounting for age and education. As with the 
battery of performance-based measures designed by Allaire and Marsiske (1999), scores on 
these assessments decrease significantly with increasing age (for a review see Thornton & 
Dumke, 2005). 
Limitations of performance-based measures 
The results of studies on performance-based measures of everyday cognitive 
functioning suggest that these measures are psychometrically sound and useful for predicting 
real world outcomes. However, an important limitation of the performance-based approach is 
the lack of ecological validity. Tasks used in performance-based measures are not personally 
relevant which may affect the effort or strategies the individual applies to the task. Previous 
research indicates that individuals use more effective strategies for completing cognitive 
tasks when the tasks are higher in personal incentives (Klehe & Anderson, 2007; Meacham 
& Singer, 1977). Additionally, performance-based tasks require tightly controlled conditions 
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that do not necessarily mirror real world experiences (Farias et al., 2008). In using these tasks 
researchers minimize the variability in performance by eliminating distractions that are a 
common part of an individual’s natural environment (e.g., cell phone) and controlling the 
strategies that individual can apply to the task. Some researchers have argued that measures 
administered in such controlled settings tend to assess an individual’s optimal level of 
performance rather than their average or typical level of performance (Cronbach, 1970). This 
implies that behavior captured in the lab does not necessarily reflect the full range of 
functioning that exists in the real world (Smyth & Stone, 2003); this is an idea acknowledged 
in other areas of research (e.g., industrial-organizational psychology; Klehe & Anderson, 
2007) that may be particularly applicable to cognitive aging. That is, as the performance of 
older adults becomes more variable with progressing age, in lab, or optimal, performance 
may be less indicative of average, or daily, levels of functioning (e.g., Hultsch, MacDonald, 
& Dixon, 2002).  
Another limitation of performance-based measures is that they are generally not 
suited for repeated administration over brief periods of time. If researchers are interested in 
day-to-day variability in everyday cognitive failures, the factors that may affect performance 
at this level, and the conditions under which failures occur, intensive daily measurements are 
necessary (Borsboom, Mellenbergh, & van Heerden, 2003; Molenaar, 2008). Performance-
based measures often require a trained research assistant to obtain valid scores (Conway et 
al., 2005) and asking individuals to repeatedly return to a lab over a short period of time is 
expensive and burdensome for both researchers and participants. Additionally, repeated 
appointments interrupt a participant’s daily life and may impact performance on these 
measures in unknown ways. Some attempts have been made to allow participants to self-
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administer performance-based tasks in their homes (e.g., Allaire & Marsiske, 2005), but this 
approach raises questions about the validity of scores (e.g.,  unsupervised participants may 
cheat or complete tasks incorrectly). Performance-based tasks are also susceptible to practice 
effects, particularly when administered over short periods of time (Allaire & Marsiske, 2005; 
Rabbitt, Diggle, Smith, Holland, & McInnes, 2001). 
These limitations suggest that performance-based measures of everyday cognitive 
functioning may not generalize to real-world functioning and may make it difficult to tease 
apart practice effects from day-to-day variability in functioning caused by other processes. 
Because of these limitations, the second approach is to have participants report on their 
ability to meet everyday cognitive demands. These self-report measures tend to focus on the 
cognitive failures individuals make while attempting to meet everyday cognitive demands. 
Self-report measures of everyday cognitive failures 
Most, if not all, individuals have experienced cognitive mishaps that affected their 
ability to complete daily tasks (Martin, 1983; Reason, 1979). Everyday cognitive failures can 
involve forgetting important information, lapses in attention and concentration, or forgetting 
to complete a started task. Research on cognitive failures suggests that memory failures tend 
to be the most often reported, although there is some disagreement over which type of 
memory failure is most prevalent (i.e., retrospective or prospective; Herrmann & Neisser, 
1978; Terry, 1988). Research has found that failures are most likely to occur when the 
individual is experiencing emotions high in arousal (Yamanaka, 2003) and during the 
transition between home and work (Reason, 1984; Yamanaka, 2003). In contrast to 
performance-based research on everyday cognitive functioning, there is less evidence of age 
differences in self-reported cognitive failures (Crawford, Smith, Maylor, Della Sala, & 
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Logie, 2003; Hertzog, Park, Morrell, & Martin, 2000; Reese & Cherry, 2006) However, other 
information regarding the nature and causes of daily cognitive failures is scarce. For 
example, do memory failures occur more often for information that is recently learned or 
well known? Theories and lab-based studies of memory suggest memory failures for recently 
learned information should occur more often (Craik, 1994) but it is unclear whether this 
applies to everyday memory failures. Most research has focused on the frequency of failures 
in general, rather than on the specific characteristics of the failures. One purpose of the 
current study is to gather more detailed information on self-reported everyday cognitive 
failures individuals.  
Self-report methods can be further sub-divided into two categories: global and daily 
diary assessments. In this context, the term "global assessments" refers to assessments that 
ask the individual to report failures over weeks or months, or to report their experiences with 
cognitive failures 'in general.' Daily diary assessments encompasses two different 
approaches. Event-contingent assessments ask participants to keep a log of the failures they 
experience as they experience them, whereas time- or signal-contingent assessments require 
participants to report on as many failures as they can after receiving a signal (or at a 
particular time of day), as in the current study. The next section describes global assessments 
of everyday cognitive failures. 
Global assessments of everyday cognitive failures 
A number of existing global assessments ask about the frequency of different types of 
failures (e.g., attention and concentration: Thought Occurrence Questionnaire [TOQ]; 
Sarason, Sarason, Keefe, Hayes, & Shearin, 1986, processing speed: Subjective Cognitive 
Complaints Questionnaire [SCCQ]; Newson & Kemps, 2006, activities of daily living: 
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Spector & Fleishman, 1998) over a range of reporting intervals. The total number of failures 
is thought to indicate an individual’s level of everyday cognitive functioning. Some of these 
questionnaires ask individuals to report how often they believe they experience these failures 
in general. For example, Johannson, Allen-Burge, and Zarit (1997) asked individuals for 
ratings of their perception of their cognitive function overall (e.g., on the whole, do you think 
that you have problems remembering things you want to do or say?).  
Other questionnaires focus on more specific time periods that can vary depending on 
the types of failures of interest. Researchers typically attempt to specify a time period that 
allows an adequate number of opportunities for individuals to experience a cognitive failure. 
For example, asking individuals to report on the number of missed appointments over a short 
period of time may result in no reported failures not because the individual kept all their 
appointments, but because they had no appointments to keep (Hannon, Adams, Harrington, 
Fries-Dias, & Gipson, 1995). This is in contrast to failures such as misplacing items and 
word-finding difficulties, which may be more frequent in daily life. The differences in the 
assumed baseline probability of real world activities has led to questionnaires that assess 
failures over weeks (Troyer & Rich, 2002) and months (Roche, Fleming & Shum, 2002), or 
the extent to which they experience this failure 'in general' to allow ample opportunities for 
individuals to experience the failures of interest.  
Construct validity of global assessments. 
Evidence for the construct validity of questionnaire measures of cognitive functioning 
comes from the relationship between these questionnaires and lab-based measures of 
cognitive performance. For example, Manly, Robertson, Galloway, and Hawkins (1999) 
found that individuals with higher scores on the Cognitive Failures Questionnaire 
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(Broadbent, Cooper, Fitzgerald, & Parkes, 1982) made significantly more errors on a 
Sustained Attention to Response Task (SART; Robertson, Manly, Andrade, Baddeley, & 
Yiend, 1997), relative to individuals with lower scores. Likewise, Hertzog and colleagues 
(Hertzog et al., 2000) found small but significant correlations between their measures of 
retrospective memory and the Frequency of Forgetting subscale of the Memory Functioning 
Questionnaire (Zelinski, Gilewski, & Anthony-Bergstone, 1990).  
Royall and colleagues (Royall, Palmer, Chiodo, & Polk, 2005) have found some of 
the strongest relationships among questionnaires and lab-based performance using that their 
measure of instrumental activities of daily living (IADLs). Self-reported difficulty with daily 
activities was significantly associated with performance on list memory (r = .50) and an 
executive functioning task (r = -.48). It is important to note that the relationships in this study 
may be inflated given the advanced age (Mage = 77.9) and impairment (<30% lived 
independently) of the sample. Additionally, while the measure of IADLs in this study was a 
self-report scale, it was administered by a trained interviewer rather than as a self-
administered paper-and-pencil measure. The introduction of a trained interviewer may have 
improved the quality of participant reports. 
A second source of evidence for the validity of questionnaire-based assessments is 
that scores on these measures are related to actual neurological impairment. Recent research 
has found that smaller hippocampi were related to more reports of memory failures 
(Striepens et al., 2010; van der Flier et al., 2004). Additionally, individuals with brain 
pathology consistent with Alzheimer's disease report more failures compared with 
individuals without this brain pathology despite scores that correspond to unimpaired 
functioning on typical objective measures of cognitive performance (van der Flier et al., 
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2004). These questionnaires also differentiate between patient groups and normal controls. 
For example, patients with head trauma (Sterr, Herron, Hayward, & Montaldi, 2006), 
dementia (Johansson, Allen-Burge, & Zarit, 1997), and depression (Wagle, Berrios, & Ho, 
1999) report significantly more cognitive failures compared to age-matched controls. 
Similarly, Peres et al. (2006) found that older adults with mild cognitive impairment reported 
significantly more difficulties with IADLs compared to normal functioning older adults 
(though still significantly fewer than those diagnosed with dementia). 
Cognitive interference as a form of cognitive failure. 
Researchers have also extended the definition of "cognitive failures" to include lapses 
in attention and concentration. Using this liberal definition, assessment of cognitive failures 
then includes "cognitive interference," or an individual’s experience of unwanted or intrusive 
thoughts and their attempts to control these thoughts (Sarason, Pierce, & Sarason, 1996; 
Wegner & Zanakos, 1994). Cognitive interference is similar to rumination or worry, and is 
associated with the psychiatric symptoms of depression, generalized anxiety, and post-
traumatic stress disorder (see Sarason, Pierce, & Sarason, 1996 for a review). However, 
unlike these constructs -- which tend to focus on recurrent negatively-valenced emotional 
content (e.g., depressive rumination) -- cognitive interference refers to any unwanted 
thought. Cognitive interference represents a form of cognitive failure by itself; an inability to 
focus one’s thoughts on the task at hand. Additionally, using limited mental resources to 
suppress an unwanted thought may cause distraction from the current task. While some 
cognitive failures questionnaires contain items that assess attentional failures (e.g., SCCQ; 
Newson & Kemps, 2006) measures of cognitive interference focus exclusively on these 
failures. Cognitive interference questionnaires also assess attempts to control intrusive 
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thoughts which may influence cognitive performance through the consumption of mental 
resources. Cognitive failures questionnaires tend not to assess attempts at thought control at 
all, possibly disregarding an important source of cognitive failures. 
Global assessments of cognitive interference. 
Cognitive interference questionnaires focus on two aspects of unwanted thoughts. 
First is the frequency of unwanted thoughts. For example, the Thought Occurrence 
Questionnaire (TOQ; Sarason, et al., 1986) asks how often an individual experiences 
thoughts unrelated to their current task. Second is how often the individual attempts to 
control unwanted thoughts. The Thought Control Questionnaire (TCQ; Wells & Davies, 
1994) asks individuals how often they try to replace an unwanted thought with other task-
related thoughts. Experiencing and controlling unwanted thoughts likely consumes cognitive 
resources that could be used to meet daily cognitive demands.  
Like the cognitive failures questionnaires described above, these assessments can 
vary with regard to the time interval under consideration, though many tend to focus on what 
individuals generally do (e.g., White Bear Suppression Inventory; Wegner & Zanakos, 1994; 
TCQ; Wells & Davies, 1994). More recent research has introduced a questionnaire that 
focuses on briefer time intervals (i.e., “Today, during this session”) to assess day-to-day 
variability in cognitive interference within an individual (Stawski, Mogle, & Sliwinski, in 
review). One aim of the current study is to examine the psychometric properties of an 
extension of this measure and its ability to differentiate both between individuals as well as 
within an individual across different days. 
Construct validity of cognitive interference questionnaires. 
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Because cognitive interference is intended to act as an index of an individual’s ability 
to focus their attention, key evidence for the validity of these questionnaires as measures of 
cognitive functioning comes from their relationship to attentionally demanding cognitive 
tasks. For instance, Stawski and colleagues (Stawski, Sliwinski, & Smyth, 2006) 
demonstrated that individuals reporting more cognitive interference had significantly slower 
reaction times on a working memory task. Kane et al. (2007) also found that individuals with 
lower working memory ability reported more off-task thinking during the day, relative to 
those with higher working memory ability.  
Similarly, McVay and Kane (2009) found that individuals were significantly more 
likely to make mistakes on a go-no go task on trials when they also reported experiencing a 
task-unrelated thought. This finding implies that when the attentional demands of a task are 
high, experiencing an unwanted thought can impair performance. In support of this 
interpretation, Friedman and Miyake (2004) showed that, compared with individuals who 
were more susceptible to proactive interference, individuals who were better able to resist 
proactive interference reported lower levels of unwanted intrusive thoughts. Whether daily 
self-reported cognitive interference is related to other types of in-lab cognitive tasks remains 
unclear. An aim of the current study is to examine the relationship of these questionnaires to 
a broader set of cognitive abilities.  
One additional piece of evidence for the validity of these measures comes from the 
finding that individuals with disorders that impair attention report experiencing more 
cognitive interference. Weyandt and Dupaul (2006) found that college students with a history 
of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) report experiencing significantly more 
intrusive thoughts compared to students without these histories. This implies that individuals 
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with reduced attentional resources experience more difficulties with cognitive interference, 
strengthening the link between cognitive interference and the ability to attend and 
concentrate. 
Limitations of global assessments. 
Despite the utility and validity of global assessments of cognitive failures, this 
method has been criticized for a number of reasons. One primary limitation is that these 
assessments may depend more on the individual’s perception of their cognitive functioning 
rather than their actual functioning, because the measures require retrospection over long 
intervals of time (Cavanaugh et al., 1998; Herrmann, 1982). Research suggests that 
individuals rely on broad frameworks of beliefs to respond to items that require retrospection 
over intervals longer than a few hours (Cavanaugh et al., 1998; Robinson & Clore, 2002). 
These responses may be more related to an individual’s beliefs about themselves and their 
abilities (e.g., self-efficacy) rather than their actual performance. Additionally, individuals 
who experience many cognitive failures may have difficulty in actually recalling these 
failures making questionnaire responses dependent on already fallible cognitive ability 
(Gorin & Stone, 2001; Rabbitt & Abson, 1990).  
A second self report method for assessing everyday cognitive failures is through daily 
diary approaches. These methods attempt to circumvent one of the limitations of global 
assessments by asking individuals to report failures over shorter periods of time. Event-
contingent reporting asks individuals to complete assessments regarding their failures as they 
occur (or are noticed). This method and relevant findings are discussed next. 
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Event-contingent method of assessing everyday cognitive failures 
 In studies using the event-contingent reporting method individuals keep a detailed 
diary of their cognitive failures as they occur throughout the day. In these studies, individuals 
report their cognitive failures as well as details regarding the time and place of the failure. 
This additional information provides greater insight into when individuals are vulnerable to 
cognitive failures. For example, Reason (1984) found that individuals were more likely to 
report making cognitive errors during transitions between home and work (e.g., I forgot to 
bring my wallet). Additionally, Yamanaka (2003) found that individuals reported most 
cognitive failures when they were preoccupied or experiencing an emotion high in arousal 
(regardless of valence). Event-contingent measures of cognitive failures add to our 
understanding of failures as they occur in the real world. This approach may reduce reporting 
biases by capturing failures as they occur, rather than relying on retrospective recall. As the 
memorability of failures may depend on the type of failure (i.e., prospective or retrospective) 
or the impact the failure has on daily functioning, asking participants to report on a failure 
before they can forget it occurred is critical to getting an accurate portrayal of everyday 
cognitive functioning.  
Limitations of the event-contingent method. 
One limitation of event-contingent reporting is that these reports may not reflect all of 
the failures an individual experiences. First, individuals can choose which failures to report 
and which to ignore, potentially affecting both the type and frequency of reported failures 
(Morris, 1984). Individuals may choose to report those failures they see as minor to present 
themselves as better at functioning outside the lab than they really are, leaving out failures 
that have a greater impact on daily functioning. Second, individuals can only report a failure 
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if they notice it. This limits reporting to those failures that are brought to the individual’s 
attention (Rabbitt & Abson, 1990), which typically occurs through the experience of 
consequences. Finally, individuals who are lower in cognitive ability may be more likely to 
experience cognitive failures but less likely to notice them (Rabbitt & Abson, 1990). If the 
individuals who make the most failures report the fewest failures, these reports would be 
poor indicators of actual everyday cognitive functioning. That is, depending on a participant 
with lower memory ability to self-initiate a report when they do notice a failure might place 
too much responsibility on the participant and lead to incorrect conclusions about their ability 
(if frequency of reported failures is used to index their cognitive performance). However, the 
relationship between objective performance and event-contingent reports remains unclear, as 
none of the available studies have examined the relationship between reports of failures 
outside the lab and in-lab cognitive performance.  
Although the event-contingent method could capture day-to-day fluctuations in 
cognitive failures, most of the studies using this method have focused on describing daily 
experiences of cognitive failures without investigating intraindividual variability. 
Additionally, though event-contingent reports of failures may reduce some reporting biases, 
they may introduce reactivity. That is, asking participants to report so frequently on failures 
may actually change the way an individual approaches daily cognitive demands in order to 
avoid making failures (and having to report them). Signal- and time-contingent daily 
measures instead adapt global measures for daily assessments. These assessments provide 
participants with examples of possible failures and ask whether they occurred throughout the 
day. These examples act as probes and may assist participants in reporting failures that 
occurred farther away in time from when the assessment is completed. Participants then only 
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report on failures once a day, but are given some assistance in recalling their failures over 
those few hours. 
Signal-contingent method of assessing everyday cognitive failures 
Neupert and colleagues (Neupert, Almeida, Mroczek, & Spiro, 2006a; 2006b; 
Whitbourne, Neupert, & Lachman, 2008) adapted the CFQ (Broadbent et al., 1982) for an 
intensive measurement study of everyday cognitive functioning. Individuals completed 
revised forms of the CFQ each night for eight days. Researchers found significant 
intraindividual variability in the reporting of cognitive failures and identified variables that 
influenced reporting of cognitive failures within an individual. For example, individuals were 
more likely to report cognitive failures on days when they also reported experiencing a 
stressor (Neupert et al., 2006a; 2006b) compared with non-stressor days and less likely to 
report cognitive failures on days they reported engaging in physical activity as opposed to 
days when no physical activity is reported (Whitbourne et al., 2008).  
By examining daily cognitive failures using this method, the aforementioned studies 
were able to identify variables that reduced (i.e., physical activity) and increased (i.e., stress) 
the likelihood of reporting of everyday cognitive failures. Consistent with other research on 
self-reported cognitive failures (e.g., Hertzog et al., 2000), Whitbourne et al. discovered that 
older adults were no more likely to report cognitive failures than younger adults. Whitbourne 
et al. (2008) also found no relationship between their measure of cognitive ability and daily 
reported failures, however, cognitive performance was assessed using a brief measure 
administered via telephone (Tun & Lachman, 2006) rather than in the lab. 
Limitations of signal-contingent method. 
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The research by Neupert and colleagues (Neupert et al., 2006a; 2006b; Whitbourne, 
Neupert, & Lachman, 2008) marks the first examination of the day-to-day variability and 
within-person predictors of cognitive failures. However, the revised forms of the CFQ 
continue to emphasize memory failures. Evidence from global and diary studies suggest that 
memory failures are the most prevalent everyday cognitive failures (Reason, 1984; 
Yamanaka, 2003), yet this may be due to biases in reporting. For instance, it is possible that 
memory failures may be most noticeable, and therefore more often reported.  
Another limitation is that no information regarding the emotional and practical 
consequences of a particular cognitive failure was collected. Not assessing the consequences 
of failures neglects the impact these failures are (or are not) having on an individual’s ability 
to function. It may be that certain types of failures are reported frequently (e.g., prospective 
memory failures) but these failures have little impact on the individual’s ability to meet 
everyday cognitive demands. Conversely, failures reported less frequently (e.g., forgetting 
someone’s name) may cause greater discomfort for the individual and have a greater impact 
on their daily functioning. Finally, the relationship between daily measures of cognitive 
failures and lab-based cognitive performance has yet to be investigated, which continues to 
limit support for the construct validity of daily measures of cognitive failures.  
Summary of introduction 
 Previous research examining everyday cognitive functioning has used both 
performance-based and self-report measures in an attempt to capture an individual’s ability to 
meet real world cognitive demands. Of these two approaches, self-report measures are more 
common due to a perception that they are more ecologically valid and easier to use both 
inside and outside the lab.  
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There are two types of self-report methods that have been used to index cognitive 
failures. Global assessments focus on the frequency of specific cognitive failures over 
prolonged (i.e., weeks or months) time intervals. Event-contingent reports are diaries an 
individual keeps of their cognitive failures over a brief period of time (e.g., a week). 
Although studies using these different methods provide valuable information regarding 
everyday cognitive failures, each method suffers from important limitations. Global 
assessments have some evidence of construct validity but may be susceptible to retrospection 
biases, as participants attempt to quantify their failures over long time intervals. Event-
contingent reports attempt to reduce retrospection biases by assessing failures as they occur, 
but these lack evidence of construct validity and may rely too heavily on the participant to 
notice (and remember to report) their failures.  
More recent research has used end of day self reports which involve retrospecting 
over much shorter periods of time. These end of day surveys assess specific examples of 
cognitive failures taken from validated global assessments. The resulting measures (e.g., 
Neupert et al., 2006a; 2006b; Whitbourne et al., 2008) have been used to examine 
intraindividual variability in everyday cognitive failures and provided evidence of 
psychosocial variables that both increase and decrease the reporting of cognitive failures 
within an individual. This marks an important step in the study of cognitive failures, as 
previous research had not considered day-to-day fluctuations in everyday cognitive failures. 
However, these measures remain limited in several ways. First, they continue to focus 
primarily on memory failures. Second, the items on these questionnaires were highly specific 
(e.g., forgetting the plot of a book) and may have limited the failures that participants could 
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report. Finally, no research has examined the relationships between lab-based cognitive 
performance and daily, self-reported cognitive failures. 
The current study 
The purpose of the current study was to extend previous research by validating an 
assessment tool of cognitive failures in the context of a daily diary study. The assessment 
used both rating scales and checklists of missed activities and memory failures to 
characterize an individual’s everyday cognitive failures. The general goal of the current study 
was to examine the properties of this assessment tool and its ability to capture the type, 
frequency and impact of cognitive failures in the real world. Specifically, the current study 
described the nature of everyday cognitive failures, explored the psychometric properties of 
the daily diary measures where appropriate, and examined the relationship of daily cognitive 
failures reported using this method to in-lab cognitive measures. 
Measurements of cognitive failures designed for the current study were made up of 
three different assessments. The first checklist asked participants for information regarding 
incomplete daily activities, the reason the individual failed to complete these activities, as 
well as follow up questions regarding the consequences they expect to experience from not 
completing these activities. This is a novel approach to assessing cognitive failures, as it 
allowed participants to report incomplete activities regardless of the reason for missing the 
activity. Reasons for not completing activities were then subdivided into cognitive and non-
cognitive categories, discussed in detail in the Methods section. A second checklist focused 
specifically on memory failures, and gathered additional information regarding the nature of 
the information forgotten (i.e., recently learned vs. known for a while) and the perceived 
consequences of the failure.  
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The final set of items addressed problems related to attention and thought control by 
assessing the extent to which an individual experiences and attempts to control intrusive or 
unwanted thoughts. Intrusive thoughts and attempts to control these thoughts may distract 
from current task performance. Because cognitive interference likely occurs frequently 
throughout the day (Kane et al., 2007; Wegner & Zanakos, 1994), asking participants to 
report on each separate occasion could create reactivity and induce unwanted thought 
monitoring. That is, frequently asking individuals about their unwanted thoughts may 
increase awareness of their thoughts and alter their responses to the questionnaire. To limit 
reactivity, participants completed a series of items assessing the general frequency of 
cognitive interference throughout the day. These assessments will provide a broader picture 
of the cognitive failures a person experiences daily, including lapses in attention, failures 
related to memory and missed activities. 
Aims & Hypotheses 
Aim 1 
The first aim of the current study was to characterize the missed activities and 
memory failures individuals reported experiencing. Missed activities were differentiated by 
reason: those missed for cognitive reasons (i.e., overload, attention and concentration, 
prospective memory) and those missed for non-cognitive reasons (i.e., somatic). Few 
previous studies have collected detailed qualitative and quantitative information about missed 
activities. The structure of the new assessment allowed an in-depth description of daily 
missed activities including frequency of occurrence, concurrent impact (i.e., bothersomeness 
and interference with daily schedule), and perceived future impact. To address the first aim, I 
examined the frequency with which individuals reported failing to meet different demands 
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for reasons related to cognitive functioning and somatic complaints. These missed activities 
were further described by the immediate consequences, perceived future consequences and 
the extent to which the unmet demand is part of the individual’s routine. With regard to 
memory failures, I examined the frequency of the different types of memory failures as well 
as the characteristics of the most frequently forgotten information (e.g., well-learned versus 
novel information).  
After characterizing everyday missed activities and memory failures, I addressed the 
following specific hypotheses: 
Hypotheses related to Aim 1. 
Hypothesis 1. Previous research suggests that individuals will most frequently report 
missing activities and memory failures related to prospective memory, that is, failure to 
complete an intended action (Crawford et al., 2003; Terry, 1988). I hypothesized that 
participants would report more prospective memory failures compared with retrospective 
memory failures. I also compared these failures on their perceived impact on the individual's 
daily life. It is possible that these failures do not differ in frequency but that prospective 
memory failures have a greater perceived impact compared with other types of failures. To 
illustrate, it is generally accepted that forgetting to take an important medication could have 
greater consequences compared with forgetting the name of a friend (though perhaps not a 
supervisor; McDaniel & Einstein, 2007). 
Hypothesis 2. In-lab research and theorizing also suggests that individuals are more 
likely to forget recently learned information compared with well known information (Craik, 
1994). However, previous research on everyday cognitive failures has generally ignored the 
distinction between recently and well-learned information. This information was collected in 
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the current study: I hypothesized that individuals would report more memory failures for 
recently learned information compared with well-learned information. Additionally, I 
hypothesized that more cognitive failures would be reported for tasks that are atypical rather 
than those that are usually part of the individual’s daily routine. I also compared these 
failures on their associated impact ratings. It is possible that the impact of a failure depends 
on the nature of missed activity or forgotten information. 
Hypothesis 3. Finally, I examined relationship of age to the different types of 
cognitive failures was examined. In their daily diary study, Whitbourne et al. (2008) found 
no difference in the number of memory failures reported across their age groups (ages 22-
85). This is consistent with other research on self-reported cognitive failures (e.g., Hertzog et 
al., 2000), but is contrary to lab-based research suggesting that older adults have diminished 
cognitive ability compared with younger adults (see Hofer & Alwin, 2008). Given that the 
current study uses self-report methods, I hypothesized older adults in the current study would 
not report more cognitive failures compared with younger adults. Previous research also has 
not examined whether the type of cognitive failure modifies the relationship between age and 
self-reported everyday cognitive failures. For example, it is possible older adults would 
report more memory failures for recently learned compared with well-known information. In 
the current study, I examined whether the type of failure reported affected the relationship 
between age and everyday cognitive failures. Similarly, given that the current study assesses 
a broader range of failures (both within the category of memory failures and in general), it is 
possible that previous research found no difference across age because of the limited range of 
failures assessed. Finally, previous research has framed items for daily assessment in terms 
of the mistakes that individuals make (e.g., did you fail to recognize, by sight, close relatives 
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or friends, or fail to recognize famous people seen on TV or in photographs?). Endorsing 
these items may have negative connotations as the participant must admit difficulty with 
cognitive functioning. The current study instead asks participants to report on activities they 
missed and then allowed them to select from a variety of reasons why they missed this 
activity, not all of which are cognitive in nature. This format may encourage participants 
(particularly older adults) to report events, as reporting does not necessarily imply difficulty 
in functioning. 
Additionally, I examined whether the perceived impact of failures depended on the 
age of the participant. The socioemotional selectivity theory of aging suggests that as 
individual, they shift their priorities away from cognitive to socioemotional goals 
(Carstensen, 1995). This motivational shift implies that older adults should rate their 
cognitive failures as lower in impact (i.e., less important) compared with younger adults. 
Alternatively, some research indicates that older adults worry about their memory 
deteriorating as this may lead to a loss of independence (Reese & Cherry, 2004). This implies 
that older adults may rate their failures as higher in impact compared with younger adults. 
Analyses in the current study examined these competing predictions. 
Aim 2 
A second aim was to conduct a formal psychometric validation of the cognitive 
interference rating scale. The first two questions capture information about qualitatively 
different cognitive failures making these items inappropriate for more traditional 
psychometric analyses (e.g., reliability or factor analysis). In contrast, the cognitive 
interference scale consists of nine separate rating scale items designed to assess a single 
construct reflecting one’s ability to focus attention, maintain concentration, and avoid being 
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distracted by unwanted thoughts. The scale was designed to tap both processes encompassed 
by cognitive interference: experience of intrusive thoughts as well as the suppression of those 
thoughts. Before using this scale to quantify cognitive interference it was important to 
determine that it measured a single reliable construct both between- as well as within-
individuals. The repeated nature of the assessments in the current study allowed an 
examination of the scale’s properties at both levels. As noted earlier, little research to date 
has examined the within-person fluctuations in cognitive interference (Kane et al., 2007; 
Stawski et al., in review) making this a necessary first step before using this measure in 
additional analyses. 
Hypotheses related to Aim 2. 
Hypothesis 4. I predicted that reliable interindividual and intraindividual variability 
would exist in cognitive interference. Acceptable between-person reliability would indicate 
that the scale is appropriate for differentiating between individuals while acceptable within-
person reliability would indicate that the scale is appropriate for differentiating different 
types of days (e.g., high vs. low stress) within an individual. I tested whether there is reliable 
variance at both the between- and within-person levels using generalizabilty theory (cf. 
Cranford et al. 2006).  
Hypothesis 5. Additionally, the hypothesized factor structure was examined using a 
multi-level factor analysis to determine whether the scale appeared to assess a single, 
coherent factor at both the between- and within-person levels. I hypothesized that a one-
factor solution would best fit the data at both levels.  
Given that two distinct functions comprise cognitive interference (i.e., experience of 
intrusions and attempts to control these intrusions; Wegner & Zanakos, 1994), it is possible 
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that a two factor solution appropriately describes the data from the measure developed in the 
current study. Other self-report measures of cognitive interference are specifically designed 
to measure these two processes (e.g., Impact of Events Scale, Horowitz, Wilner, & Alvarez, 
1978; White Bear Suppression Inventory, Wegner & Zanakos, 1994). If a one-factor solution 
did not fit the data, I was prepared to use a two factor solution with items addressing each of 
these aspects of cognitive interference. 
Hypothesis 6. Finally, to establish the discriminant validity of the cognitive 
interference scale, I examined the relationship between cognitive interference and negative 
affect. Cognitive interference is similar to rumination, a construct related to depression and 
negative affect (Moberly & Watkins, 2008; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000). It is therefore important 
to examine the between- and within-person relationships between the cognitive interference 
and negative affect questionnaires to determine that these were assessing separate constructs 
at both levels. The original version of the cognitive interference questionnaire was found to 
measure a construct separable from negative affect (Stawski et al., in review) and I 
hypothesized that this would apply to the extended version used in the current study. 
Aim 3 
The third aim was to investigate the relationships of everyday cognitive failures, 
cognitive interference and individual differences in objective cognitive performance in the 
lab. Self-report measures of everyday cognitive failures were designed to serve as an index of 
actual cognitive ability and should be related to objective cognitive performance in the lab. 
The nature of the questions allowed a more in-depth examination of the differential 
relationships between self-reported cognitive failures and objective cognitive performance. 
For example, cognitive failures related to activities that are not part of an individual’s routine 
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may show differential relations to cognitive tasks compared to failures for more familiar 
activities. Similarly, memory failures for recently learned information may be more related to 
working memory ability, while failures related to well known information might show 
stronger relationships with episodic memory. However, previous research on cognitive 
failures has not made these distinctions when examining the relationships between cognitive 
failures and objective performance. 
Previous research has suggested that cognitive interference (i.e., failures of attention 
and concentration) is significantly related to working memory ability using global reports of 
cognitive interference (Klein & Boals, 2001; Stawski et al., 2006). I will test whether this is 
true of daily reports of cognitive interference and whether cognitive interference is related to 
any of the other cognitive abilities assessed in the current study. 
Hypotheses related to Aim 3. 
Hypothesis 7. I tested the specific and general relationships among the different 
assessments of cognitive functioning used in the present study. For example, I examined the 
relationships of the specific types of failures are related to performance on specific cognitive 
tasks (e.g., retrospective memory failures and episodic memory performance). Previous 
research has found that the relationship between lab-based performance and self-reported of 
cognitive failures is strongest when these assessments tap similar abilities (e.g., prospective 
memory; Hertzog et al., 2000). However, this relationship has not been tested with a broader 
range of cognitive failures. Additionally, no study has looked at the relationship between 
daily diary reports of everyday cognitive failures and in-lab cognitive performance. 
Hypothesis 8. I examined the impact of temporal proximity of the assessments on the 
relationships among cognitive failures and objective cognitive performance. That is, it is 
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possible that assessments of cognitive failures completed closer in time to administration of 
the cognitive measures may be more related to in-lab cognitive performance compared to 
those completed farther away in time.  
Hypothesis 9. I tested the relationship between working memory ability and daily 
reports of cognitive interference. I hypothesized that objective tests of working memory will 
be significantly related to self-reports of cognitive interference (c.f. Stawski et al., 2006). I 
also investigated the relationship of cognitive interference to a broader range of cognitive 
abilities. 
Hypothesis 10. Similar to hypothesis 8, I examined the influence of temporal 
proximity of the assessments on the relationships between cognitive interference and 
objective cognitive performance. That is, assessments of cognitive interference completed 
closer in time to administration of the cognitive measures may be more related to cognitive 
performance compared to those completed farther away in time. 
Method 
Design 
 The current study used a variety of lab-based measures, as well as palmtop 
computers, to collect information regarding an individual’s cognitive performance in and out 
of the lab. During in-lab sessions, participants completed a number of paper-and-pencil 
measures assessing personality and affect as well as a battery of computerized exercises 
examining objective cognitive performance. Outside the lab using the palmtop computers, 
participants filled out reports of everyday cognitive functioning (i.e., missed activities, 
memory failures and cognitive interference) and other daily experiences such as stressful 
events, physical symptoms, sleep quality, and affect while in their usual environments. Data 
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for the current study were collected as part of a larger project and only a subset of the 
measures were used in the present analyses. 
Participants  
 One hundred and eighty-eight individuals expressed interest in the current study. 
Participants were recruited through a number of different methods: 101 were referred to the 
study from other current participants (53.7%), 48 were participants in previous studies 
conducted by our lab (25.5%), 11 received a letter about the study (5.5%), 9 saw an ad on the 
electronic billboard Craig’s List (4.5%), 6 saw a flyer posted in a public place (3.2%), 2 were 
recruited via emails (1%), 10 saw an ad in the local Pennysaver newspaper (6.5%) and one 
person had no referral data. Recruitment materials appear in Appendix A. Of the 188 
individuals that were initially screened in the pre-study, 131 were included in the final 
dataset for analysis. I describe throughout this section how and why individuals were 
excluded from the final dataset. In summary, of the 188 individuals that participated in the 
prescreening study 22 were not eligible, 12 were not interested in continuing, 14 did not 
complete the longer study despite being eligible and interested, 4 did not return their palm 
pilots, and 5 completed the 7-day study but did not complete the primary measure of interest 
(the cognitive failures questionnaire). 
 The final sample included 131 participants with an average age of 48.53 (SD = 15.86) 
and 55.7% of the sample was female. On average, the current sample had a little more than a 
high school education (M = 13.5 years, SD = 2.69) and 39.5% were employed at the time of 
participation. The race breakdown is similar to the population from which the sample was 
selected (Upstate New York) with the majority of the participants being Caucasian (54.2%) 
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followed by individuals identifying as Black (35.1%). The remaining participants were of 
Hispanic (4.6%), or other (6.1%). 
Procedure 
 The current study consisted of two parts. Participants initially completed a pre-
screening study. Participants that adequately completed the pre-screening study (as defined 
below) were invited to participate in the Full study. 
Pre-screening study 
 Individuals interested in the study received detailed information regarding the 
commitment related to participating and the general goals of the research. Those who 
expressed interest, were in the proper age range (i.e., 20-80 years old), spoke fluent English 
and woke up after 4am but before 11am were invited to participate in the initial pre-screening 
study. The telephone screening questionnaire can be found in Appendix B.  
The pre-screening study was a brief version of the full study and included 2 in-lab 
sessions and 2 days of ecological momentary assessment (described below). The first session 
included the consent process, a demographics questionnaire (see Appendix C) and training in 
the use of the palmtop computer for the daily assessments. For 2 consecutive days following 
this initial session, participants completed the daily assessments. Participants returned the 
palmtop computer within 4-5 days of the first session. At this appointment, participants were 
thanked for their time and effort and compensated for returning the palm pilot. All 
participants also heard a description of the second part of the study and were asked whether 
they were interested in the second part of the study if they were determined to be eligible. Of 
the 188 participants who completed the pre-screening study, 173 (92%) indicated they would 
be interested in participating in the second part. 
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 Inclusion criteria.  
Participants who correctly completed at least one morning survey, one evening 
survey, and 6 of 10 beeped surveys were invited to complete the second part of the study. To 
be considered correctly completed, beeped surveys had to be started within 30 minutes of the 
scheduled beep and could last no longer than 30 minutes from start to finish. Of the 173 
individuals who participated in the pre-study and expressed interest in the 7-day study, 153 
(88.4%) were eligible for the full study and 140 of these individuals attempted to participate 
in the 7-day study. 
Full study 
 In lab protocol. 
The procedure for the full study included 2 in-lab sessions and 7 days of daily 
palmtop computer assessments. During the first in-lab session, participants received refresher 
training with the palmtop computers to ensure familiarity with the daily assessment protocol. 
At this session, which lasted one and a half hours, they also completed a series of 
questionnaires assessing personality, health behaviors, stressful events, perceived stress, trait 
cognitive interference, and social support. Details of the questionnaires used in the current 
study are described in the measures section and all questionnaires can be found in Appendix 
D.  
On the day following the first session of the full study, participants began completing 
daily assessments using the palmtop computer and these daily assessments continued through 
the next 7 days. Eight to ten days after the first session, participants returned for their second 
session which lasted approximately 2.5 hours. During this session, compliance with the daily 
assessment protocol was reviewed for compensation purposes. Participants also completed a 
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battery of cognitive tasks and health measures. The health measures included blood pressure, 
body fat analysis, hip-waist ratio, height, weight, and glycated hemoglobin (percent HbA1c); 
these measures are not used in the proposed analyses for the current study. The cognitive 
measures in the current study included measures of processing speed, working memory, 
crystallized intelligence, mental set switching, and episodic memory. The order for 
administration of these tasks was constant across all participants. Cognitive tasks were 
administered in the following order: Object Match, Trails, Auditory Verbal Learning Test, 
Spatial Span, Letter-Number Sequencing, Letter Match, Spatial Memory, Number Match, 
Subtract 2 Span, Shipley Vocabulary, Symbol Search, Backward Letter Span, Letter Series, 
and Paired Associates. Task procedures for those tasks used in the current study are 
described in the measures section below, and descriptions and example problems for all tasks 
can be found in Appendix E. 
 Ecological momentary assessment protocol. 
 Participants received a palmtop computer that they were asked to carry for seven 
consecutive days. Each day participants completed up to seven assessments: a morning 
assessment, an evening assessment, and 5 prompted assessments (beeped assessments). 
Participants completed the morning assessment as soon as they woke (morning assessment) 
and the evening assessment just prior to going to bed (evening assessment). Participants were 
not told when the prompted assessments would occur, as these are scheduled for pseudo-
random times spaced approximately 2-3 hours apart throughout the day. At recruitment 
participants provided a normal waking time and this time was used to assign a suitable 
schedule of beeped assessments during the participant’s waking hours. The different possible 
beep schedules appear in Appendix F. The measures completed during these assessments and 
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analyzed in the current study are described in the Measures section. All assessment 
information appears in Appendices G and H. 
Measures 
Ecological momentary assessment measures 
Everyday cognitive functioning.  
Full details of these questions are provided in Appendix G. 
Incomplete activities and memory failures checklists. Participants completed these 
measures at the evening assessment. Using a checklist format, they indicated any activities 
they did not complete that day and reported why they did not complete these tasks 
(incomplete activities checklist). Participants were able to select as many activities as they 
wished, and were asked to provide reasons for why they did not complete each task they 
selected. Reasons an activity may have been missed included “ran out of time,” “couldn’t 
concentrate,” and “too tired.” In addition, participants provided a rating of both the 
immediate (i.e., how much does not completing [selected activity] bother you now? and how 
much did not completing [selected activity] interfere with your daily routine?) and future 
(i.e., do you think not [selected activity] will have consequences beyond today?) 
consequences associated with not completing the selected task. All ratings were made on a 
scale from 1-7 (1 = not at all to 7 = very much). For any incomplete activity, participants also 
indicated whether that activity is part of their regular routine.  
A second checklist asked specifically about items the individual forgot that day 
(memory failures checklist). The individual indicated the type of information forgotten and 
the impact forgetting had on their daily routine. Like the missed activities checklist, 
participants rated the immediate and future consequences of the failure. and whether the 
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forgotten information was part of their routine (i.e., taking medicine, an errand, household 
chore, appointment) or was well known (i.e., important information, directions, personal 
date, name). If the individual indicated they experienced no memory failures that day, they 
filled out a brief questionnaire on the strategies they use for improving their memory (e.g., 
how often they wrote things down that day). This was done to encourage participants to 
report memory failures as reporting no failures did not allow them to finish the question more 
quickly. 
Incomplete activities and memory failures reported in these two questions were 
placed in one of five categories: retrospective memory, prospective memory, attentional 
demands, overload, and somatic. All but activities missed due to somatic complaints were 
considered cognitive failures. Retrospective memory failures included memory failures for 
“directions,” “a name,” “where you put something,” “important information,” or “personal 
date.” Prospective memory failures included the categories “taking medicine,” “an errand,” 
“household chore,” or “an appointment” as well as uncompleted activities reported as “forgot 
to start it” and “started, but forgot to finish.” Attentional demand failures were activities 
missed because the participant “couldn’t concentrate.” Overload demand failures included 
failures due to “ran out of time,” “it was too difficult,” “decided to avoid it,” “was 
interrupted,” and “something more important came up.” Somatic-related failures included 
“not feeling well” and “too tired.” (Also see Table 6 for a summary of how failures were 
categorized as well as frequencies with which each category was reported.) 
Cognitive interference. At the evening assessment, participants reported the extent to 
which they experienced cognitive interference during the day. Using an extended version of 
the questionnaire developed by Stawski et al. (in review), participants rated on a scale from 
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1-7 (1 = not at all, 7 = very often) the number of times they experienced unwanted thoughts 
and made attempts to control these thoughts. The stem for these questions was “today, how 
often did you” and sample ends include “think about personal worries,” “have thoughts that 
kept jumping into your head,” and “try to avoid certain thoughts.” The full questionnaire is 
provided in Appendix G. 
Daily psychosocial assessments.  
Throughout the seven day period participants also reported on their experience of 
stressors, affect, physical symptoms, and sleep quality. All items are provided in Appendix H 
and brief descriptions of those analyzed in the current study are offered below.  
Stress. At the beeped surveys, participants reported on any stressors they had 
experienced since their last assessment. They provided qualitative information on each 
stressor (e.g., an argument, work stress) as well as quantitative information (e.g., the extent to 
which this event upset them). If a participant reported not experiencing a stressor they 
completed another series of questions regarding why they believed they did not experience a 
stressor. These questions were designed to encourage participants to report their stressful 
events as not reporting a stressor would not allow them to complete the assessment more 
quickly. 
Affect. At each of the beeped assessments, participants completed two measures of 
affect to indicate how they had felt since the last assessment. First a series of 4 items 
presented rating scales with opposing emotions (e.g., stressed v. relaxed) and asked 
participants to decide which emotion better characterized their feelings. Following this a 
series of 8 adjectives were presented and participants rated how much each adjective 
characterized their emotions on a scale from 1 (i.e., not at all) to 7 (i.e., extremely).  
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The reporting interval for affect differed for each of the assessment types. For the 
morning assessment, participants were asked to report on how they expected they would feel 
that day. At the beeped assessments they were asked about their current state. In the evening 
assessment, they were asked to report how they had felt throughout the day (i.e., in general 
during the day).  
Lab-based cognitive tasks  
Participants completed a number of lab-based cognitive tasks assessing a variety of 
cognitive constructs. Descriptions of cognitive tasks used in the current analyses appear 
below. Screen shots and descriptions of all cognitive tasks are included in Appendix E.  
Episodic memory.  
Participants completed 3 measures of episodic memory: the auditory verbal learning 
test (AVLT; Rey, 1964), a version of the paired associates subtest from the Wechsler 
Memory Scale (WMS; Wechsler, 1997a) and a spatial memory task. 
Auditory verbal learning test. Participants studied a list of 15 words for one minute. 
At the end of the minute, they were given one minute to recall all the words they can 
remember. The dependent measure is the number of correctly recalled words in one minute. 
Paired associates. Participants saw a list of 8 word-number pairs. Then the word 
from each pair was presented and the participant recalled the number that was paired with it. 
There were four trials in this task for a total of 32 responses. The dependent measure is the 
total number of correctly recalled numbers over all four trials. 
Spatial memory. Participants saw a playing card presented in one of four different 
locations on the screen. After a series of cards presented in different locations, participants 
were shown a playing card and asked to click the location that playing card appeared. Each 
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trial included 6 cards and participants completed 4 trials. The dependent measure is the total 
cards correctly matched to their locations. 
Working memory.  
Participants completed 3 measures of working memory: a backward letter span 
(Waters & Caplan, 2002), a subtract 2 task (Waters & Caplan, 2002), and a letter-number 
sequencing task (Wechsler, 1997a).  
Backward letter span. Participants saw a series of letters presented one at a time for 1 
second each. At the end of each series participants recalled all of the letters they saw in 
reverse order. The number of letters in each series varied from 3-7 and participants attempted 
2 trials at each length. The dependent measure is the total number of the items for trials that 
were perfectly recalled. 
Subtract 2 span. Participants saw a series of numbers presented one at a time for 1 
second each. At the end of each series participants recalled all of the numbers they saw after 
subtracting 2 from each. The number of digits in each series varied from 3-7 and participants 
attempted 2 trials at each of those lengths. The dependent measure is the total number of the 
items for trials that were perfectly recalled. 
Letter-number sequencing (LNS). Participants were read a series of letters and 
numbers in a random (pre-determined) order. They then recalled all the numbers in numerical 
order and followed by the letters in alphabetical order. The number of items in each set 
ranges from 2 to 8 and participants attempted 3 trials at each length. The dependent measure 
is the number of trials that were perfectly recalled. 
Inductive reasoning.  
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Participants completed two measures of inductive reasoning: Ravens matrices 
(Raven, 1976) and a letter series completion task.  
Letter series completion. Participants were provided with a number of letter strings. 
Each of these letter strings followed a pattern and the participant selected the next letter in 
the pattern from the options provided. The dependent measure is the total number of items 
correctly answered in 6 minutes with a possible total of 30. 
Ravens matrices. Participants saw an image with a piece missing or set of images 
with one missing. Participants were provided with a set of possible options and selected the 
piece that best completed the image or set of images. Participants completed the odd-
numbered items only. The dependent measure is the total number of items correctly answered 
out of a possible 30. 
Lab-based psychosocial measures  
Participants completed a number of questionnaire measures including assessments of 
personality and demographic characteristics. All questionnaires are included in Appendices C 
and D. The questionnaires were administered in the following order: Medical History and 
Health Behaviors, Perceived Stress Scale, Thought Occurrence Questionnaire, Self-Efficacy, 
Impact of Events Scale, White Bear Suppression Inventory, Social Support, Life Events 
Checklist, Thought Control Questionnaire, Health Survey Short Form, Personality Scale, and 
Center for Epidemiological Studies-Depression Scale. Only the subset of these 
questionnaires used in the analyses of the current study are described below. All 
questionnaires appear in Appendices C and D. 
Demographics. Participants completed a measure assessing general demographic 
characteristics including age, gender, education, income, and race. 
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Personality. Participants completed a measure of personality based on items from the 
International Personality Item Pool (Goldberg et al., 2006). The items in this pool were 
developed to tap the Big Five personality characteristics: neuroticism, extraversion, 
agreeableness, openness to experience, and conscientiousness. Cronbach's alphas in the 
current study were .83, .64, .67, .76, and .76 for these subscales, respectively. 
Thought Control questionnaire. The original scale contained 30 items asking about 
the strategies individuals typically use to control their intrusive thoughts when they 
experience one. The current study focused on two of the subscales of the original 
questionnaire: worry and punishment. Strategies were rated on a 4-point scale from never to 
almost always. Sample items included “I punish myself for thinking the thought” and “I keep 
myself busy.” The reported total scale reliability is α = .77 (Wells & Davies, 1994) and the 
reliability coefficients for the subscales in the current study were α = .83 for the worry 
subscale and α = .73 for the punishment subscale. 
Thought Occurrence questionnaire. Participants completed 28 items assessing the 
types of thoughts they have while “they have to concentrate on something.” For example, “I 
think about how poorly I am doing” and “I think about friends.” There was a 5-point 
response scale from never to very often. Previous research found a Cronbach’s alpha of .93 
(Sarason et al., 1986) and the alpha was .73 in the current study. 
White Bear Suppression inventory. This scale consisted of 15 items designed to assess 
the experience of intrusive thoughts and what the individual does to control these thoughts. 
Items included “I wish I could stop thinking about certain things” and “I often do things to 
distract myself from my thoughts” and responses were made on a 5-point scale from strongly 
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disagree to strongly agree. Reliability estimates ranged from .87 to .89 in previous studies 
(Wegner & Zanakos, 1994) and was .92 in the current study. 
Impact of Events scale. Participants reported on the most stressful event of their life 
along with details such as whether they received counseling for this event and whether the 
event is continuing to cause them stress. After providing details of the event, participants 
completed a 15-item rating scale assessing the extent to which they thought about this 
stressful event in the past week. Sample items included “I thought about it when I didn’t 
mean to” and “I tried not to talk about it.” Responses to the rating scale questions were made 
on a 4-point scale from not at all to often. Previous research found adequate reliability for the 
rating scale portion of the questionnaire (Cronbach’s α = .86; Horowitz, Wilner, & Alvarez, 
1979), a finding replicated in the current study (Cronbach’s α = .89). 
Data preparation 
Final sample 
One hundred and forty individuals were eligible and interested in the 7-day study 
following completion of the pre-study. Of these individuals, 4 never returned their palm 
pilots, 3 experienced hardware failures, and 2 returned their palm pilots but had not 
completed any of the evening surveys thus providing no data primary measure of interest: the 
cognitive failures questionnaires. This led to the inclusion of 131 individuals in the final 
dataset. 
 
Ecological Momentary Assessment data 
Prior to conducting any analyses designed to address the study aims, participant 
compliance and any missing data patterns were examined. First, I determined whether any 
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assessments were not compliant with the study protocol. Specifically, participants were 
instructed to complete the evening survey once each evening within an hour of going to bed. 
In the current sample of 131 participants, there were 917 possible assessments (1 assessment 
per day for 7 days times 131 participants). Of the possible assessments, participants 
completed 833 assessments and 758 (91%) were considered compliant for use in the analyses 
in the current study.  In cases where participants completed more than 1 survey for a given 
day, the first completed survey was used (n = 29). Additionally, assessments completed 
between midnight and 4am on a particular day were assumed to refer to the previous day’s 
events. Those assessments completed after 4am (but before 8pm) were excluded due to their 
proximity to morning and beeped assessments on the following day (n = 33). After removing 
noncompliant assessments, participant compliance was calculated by dividing the number of 
surveys correctly completed by 7. Average participant compliance was 82.7% (~5.8 surveys). 
Table 1 includes the breakdown of actual evening assessment completion. More than 80% of 
the participants completed 5 or more of the surveys correctly over the seven day period. 
Compliance was also assessed for beeped assessments to determine which would be 
included in the confirmatory factor analytic models in Aim 2. Participants were instructed to 
complete a beeped survey at five pseudo-random times per day. Assessments completed 
within 15 minutes of the scheduled time were considered compliant with the beeped protocol. 
There were a total of 4,585 beeped assessments possible over the entire sample and a total of 
4,302 beeped assessments were completed. Of these assessments, 226 were outside the 15 
minute time window. An additional 32 were eliminated because they were completed after 
the participant’s seven day study period had ended. (Palm pilots continued to beep and some 
participants continued to do surveys even though the seven days had ended.) As with the 
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evening survey, in cases where participants completed 2 assessments for the same beep the 
first of those surveys was included in the final data analysis. This led to the elimination of 
another 336 assessments. On average participants completed 80.8% of the beeped 
assessments correctly and the full breakdown of beeped compliance is available in Table 2. 
In the current sample, 102 of the 131 participants correctly completed 70% or more of the 
beeped assessments indicating good overall compliance with the study protocol. 
Missing Data Analyses 
Because of the amount of missing data in the current study, it was important to 
determine whether the data were 1) missing completely at random, 2) missing at random, or 
3) non-ignorable missingness. If the data are missing completely at random (MCAR) this 
would indicate that there is no underlying relationship between the missing values and other 
variables (observed or not). This is the best case scenario as the missing data are independent 
of both predictors and outcomes and will not bias analyses. The second possible case is that 
data are missing at random (MAR). In this case, the missing values are not completely 
independent of all variables but can be predicted by observed variables within the dataset. 
This would imply that although missing values are related to informative variables, those 
variables were observed and can be used to control for the pattern of missingness in the 
dataset. Finally, informative missing implies that missing values are dependent on some 
unobserved variable or variables. Although it is not possible to rule the possibility of 
informative missingness, it is possible to determine whether any of the observed variables are 
related to the pattern of missing data. If missing values are dependent on person-level 
characteristics measured in the current study, these characteristics can be included in 
predictive models as covariates to control for any spurious relationships driven by 
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systematically missing values and reduce bias in the estimates due to non-participation (Little 
& Rubin, 1987). 
The first step in assessing missing data patterns was to determine whether missing 
values were related to any of the demographic, personality, or cognitive variables at the 
between-person level. Spearman correlations were calculated among these variables and 
compliance for both the beeped and evening surveys (Table 3) and generally evidenced weak 
relationships. There was no consistent pattern of relationship between the cognitive variables 
and compliance. Number of evening surveys completed was marginally associated with 
episodic memory ability (r = .17, p = .06). On the other hand, better compliance with the 
beeped surveys was significantly though weakly related to higher fluid intelligence ability (r 
= .19, p = .03). With regard to personality, compliance with the protocol for both surveys 
showed small but significant correlations with measures of trait cognitive interference (r's = -
.17 to -.26); those individuals reporting less propensity to experience intrusive thoughts were 
more compliant with survey schedule. Lastly, compliance with both surveys showed small 
positive correlations with age (r's = .18 and .20) implying that older adults completed more 
surveys correctly.  
The second step used to examine missing data patterns was to determine whether any 
day-level characteristics (i.e., within-person variables) influenced the completion of a 
particular evening survey. Non-linear logistic mixed models used day in study, day of week, 
daily self-reported stressful events, and daily self-reported affect to predict the probability of 
completing the evening survey. Prior to conducting analyses it was important to determine 
whether the likelihood that a participant would complete the evening survey changed as the 
study progressed or was affected by other variables observed in the current study. For 
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example, it is possible that participants would be less likely to respond on high stress days 
compared with low stress days. This could bias results if participants systematically fail to 
complete surveys depending on the characteristics of the day. Day in study significantly 
predicted compliance with the evening protocol. Participants were less likely to complete the 
evening assessment as the study progressed (F[6, 673] = 32.42, p < .0001) though the 
difference in probability of completion was small (p[completion first day in study] = .91 v. 
p[completion last day in study] = .88). Conversely, participants were more likely to complete 
the evening assessment on days when they reported experiencing higher than average 
positive affect (PA; F[1, 912] = 5.28, p = .022; p[completion on days with 1 point higher PA] 
= .90 v. p[completion on days with 1 point lower PA] = .88) and on days when they reported 
at least one stressor (F[1, 912] = 8.36, p = .004; p[completion on stress days] = .93 v. 
p[completion on no stress days] = .86). Day of week and negative affect had no effect on 
probability of completing the evening assessment (p’s > .16). 
Finally, before addressing the primary aims of the study, I examined the correlations 
among personality, self-reported cognitive failures, and the perceived impact of these 
failures. This was done to determine whether any personality variables appeared to affect the 
reporting of failures and the perceived severity of their impact. Previous research has found 
that personality traits such as neuroticism can affect the number of physical symptoms 
reported (Larsen & Kasimatis, 1991) as well as the severity of discomfort associated with 
these symptoms. Additionally, previous research has found positive correlations (r's = .28 to 
.43) between neuroticism and cognitive failures (Broadbent et al., 1982; Merckelbach, Muris, 
Nijman, & de Jong, 1996; Wallace, 2004). A similar trend appeared in the current data: 
neuroticism was positively correlated with frequency of failures as well as with their 
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perceived impact (Table 4). No other personality characteristics were consistently related to 
both frequency and impact. Because neuroticism did appear to have an effect on the reporting 
of failures and their impact, I controlled for neuroticism in all models comparing frequency 
and impact across the different categories of missed activities and memory failures. 
Results 
The primary purpose of the current study was to design assessment tools for the 
measurement of missed activities, memory failures, and cognitive interference suitable for 
administration in a daily diary study. In the following section, I will discuss analyses that 
evaluate and validate these daily measures in an sample of adults aged 20 to 80. The first aim 
examined the frequency and impact of several types of missed activities and memory failures 
and whether the frequency of these missed activities and memory failures depended on 
typicality of the activity or forgotten information or the age of the participant. Aim 2 
examined the psychometric properties of a Likert-style measure of failures related to 
attentional control. Finally, Aim 3 focused on the relationship between the daily measure of 
self-reported cognitive failures and performance on traditional lab-based cognitive tasks. The 
first aim discussed describes the frequency of different failures as well as their perceived 
impact in detail. 
Aim 1 
 These analyses focused on the two checklists that participants completed assessing 
incomplete activities and memory failures. Incomplete activities were subdivided into 
categories addressing both cognitive failures and non-cognitive failures. The memory failures 
were broken down into failures for intended actions (prospective memory) and for previously 
learned information (retrospective memory). Before addressing the primary hypotheses for 
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aim 1, I began by comparing the frequencies of incomplete activities and the frequencies of 
memory failures across categories. Following these analyses, I then compared the impact 
ratings across categories separately for each of these items. Finally, I pooled all of the 
information provided in these items to compare the relative frequencies and impact of missed 
activities and memory failures. 
Frequency of Incomplete Activities and Memory Failures 
 Incomplete activities 
The data analyzed for this aim were gathered using the incomplete activities checklist 
described in Appendix G.  This item asked whether there were any activities the participant 
wished to complete that day that they were unable to accomplish. There were 7 different 
activities the participant could report missing as well as an “other” category for events that 
could not be otherwise classified. Participants reported at least one missed activity on over 
50% of evening surveys (n = 430 of 833). On 34.6% of measurement occasions participants 
reported one missed activity, 2 missed activities 12.7% of measurement occasions, 3 missed 
activities on 2.6% of occasions and 4 or more missed activities on the remaining 1.7% (n = 
14) occasions.  
The breakdown of reporting for each of the different activities is reported in Table 5. 
For any activity endorsed, the participant also indicated why they did not complete the 
activity and these reasons were divided into four superordinate categories. Table 6 includes 
the frequency with which each different reason was selected as well as the overall frequency 
of the associated category. Activities missed for “other reasons” could not be classified into 
the different failures categories and were excluded from further analysis (n = 103; 16.43%). 
This should be differentiated from “other” activities that were missed. Missed activities 
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indicated as “other” could be included if the participant indicated a reason that fit in one of 
the categories. Because of the low frequency of attention failures (n = 11) reported in this 
item, these failures were excluded from analyses and frequencies were compared across the 
remaining three categories: overload, prospective memory, and somatic. 
The main purpose of aim 1 was to determine whether there were significant 
differences in the frequency and impact of reported failures across the three categories. To 
test for differences among the different types of failures, I fit non-linear mixed models (SAS 
Proc Glimmix) to compare the frequencies of failures across the three most frequent 
categories of failures—overload, PM and somatic failures. Because these were counts of the 
number of failures over the seven days of the study, the underlying distribution was modeled 
using Poisson regression. Model fit was evaluated using the ratio of the Pearson Chi-Square 
to degrees of freedom. There is no widely accepted rule of thumb for this statistic, 
researchers generally agree that values closer to 1 and under 2 indicate adequate 
representation of the underlying distribution. In cases where a Poisson distribution did not 
appear to model the distribution appropriately, a negative binomial was fit to the data to 
determine whether this distribution resulted in better model fit. Unless otherwise noted, the 
Poisson distribution was used to model the distribution. For these models, effect sizes are 
reported as risk ratios (RR) which reflect the risk of a particular event relative to another 
event (e.g., the risk of an overload failure relative to the risk of a somatic failure). 
Before fitting the first model comparing frequencies, I determined that differences in 
responding rates were significantly related to the frequency of reported failures. This effect 
suggested that individuals who responded least to the evening surveys also tended to report 
fewer failures (F[5, 650] = 8.24, p < .01). (This may suggest bias as forgetting to complete 
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the evening survey may be considered a cognitive failure.) Because of this relationship, the 
response variables (i.e., the number of  failures in the different categories) were corrected for 
frequency of reporting by estimating the number of failures an individual would have 
reported had they completed all 7 days of assessments based on their rate of failures on the 
days they actually completed the surveys. For example, an individual who reported 2 failures 
over the five days of assessment would be adjusted to 2.8 to estimate the rate of failures had 
they responded to all of the assessments as directed. It is important to note this correction 
does make the assumption that the likelihood of a failure would be constant over the duration 
of the study and across individuals with different response rates.  
Following correction of the outcome variable, I began by fitting a model to compare 
the frequency of failures across the three categories. This model compared the frequencies of 
missed activities due to prospective memory, overload, and somatic reasons. There was a 
significant effect of category (F[2, 256] = 96.2, p < .01). Missed activities due to overload 
were reported significantly more frequently than missed activities for other reasons. Model 
estimated counts indicated that participants reported 2 missed activities due to overload 
compared with less than one activities due to somatic reasons over the seven day period (RR 
= 1.93). 
  Memory failures 
Similar to the incomplete activities item, I began analyses of the memory failures 
checklist item by examining the frequency of the different types of daily forgetting. There 
were nine different items participants could indicate they had forgotten during that day as 
well as an “other” category for a forgotten item that could not be otherwise classified. 
Participants reported 358 forgotten items over the course of the study. On 23.9% (n = 199) of 
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measurement occasions participants reported at least 1 memory failure; 2 memory failures on 
7.7% of occasions (n = 64), and 3 or more memory failures on the remaining 1.2% (n = 10). 
Items in this question were classified into two types of memory failures. Table 7 details the 
number of failures for each type of information as well as the overall frequencies of the 
superordinate categories. Because "other" items could not be classified as retrospective or 
prospective, they were treated as a separate category in these analyses (n = 49; 13.7%).  
As with the incomplete activities question, I began by comparing the frequencies of 
prospective memory, retrospective memory, and unclassified memory failures using 
nonlinear mixed models. There was a significant effect of type of memory failure on 
reporting frequency (F[2, 256] = 33.04, p < .01). The frequency of reporting for prospective 
memory and retrospective memory failures was not significantly different (p = .13) but both 
of these memory failures were reported more frequently than unclassified memory failures 
(p’s < .01; RRs = 2.96 and 3.49 respectively). 
Impact of incomplete activities and memory failures 
For each of the missed activities and memory failures reported, participants also rated 
the extent to which missing that activity or forgetting the item bothered them, the degree to 
which the event interfered with their daily schedule and whether they anticipated 
experiencing future consequences. The means for these ratings broken down by type of 
missed activity as well as reason and overall category appear in Table 6 and the same data 
appear in Table 7 for memory failures. Because some participants reported more than 1 event 
in a given category on a given day, two different means were calculated for each rating. For 
the mean and standard deviation in column labeled 'Mean-A' the average of these two ratings 
was taken to calculate the overall category mean while in column labeled 'Mean-M' the 
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maximum of the two ratings was taken to calculate the overall category mean. The 
differences between these two calculations of the mean were small and for analyses 
comparing these ratings across categories the first mean (using the average of the two 
ratings) was used. For these analyses, effect sizes were calculated using Cohen's d. For this 
measure of effect size, effects ranging from .2 to .5 represent small effects, .5 to .8 medium 
effects, and greater than .8 large effects. 
Incomplete activities. 
Because the rating scales were continuous, multilevel linear mixed models (SAS Proc 
Mixed) were fit to determine whether a particular type of missed activity was rated as more 
bothersome than the others, creates more perceived interference in an individual’s daily 
activities, or is associated with greater future consequences. Omnibus tests indicated there 
was no significant difference among the three categories of missed activities in how bothered 
people were (p = .16), how interfering the missed activities were (p = .09) or perceived future 
consequences (p = .73). These findings imply that although missed activities due to overload 
were the most commonly reported incomplete activity, they were not rated as more irritating, 
interfering or having more future consequences than the other types of missed activities. 
Memory failures. 
Models were also fit to the three impact ratings to determine whether these ratings 
were significantly different across the memory failures. For bothersome-ness ratings, the 
effect of category was significant, F(2, 64) = 6.45, p < .01 and specific contrasts indicated 
that prospective and retrospective memory ratings did not differ in their ratings (p = .93) 
though both were significantly higher than ratings of bothersome-ness for unclassified 
memory failures (p’s < .01, d = 0.87 and 0.89 respectively). Conversely, there was not a 
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significant difference across the types on their interference ratings (p = .37). Finally, with 
respect to anticipation of future consequences, there were significant differences across the 
categories (F[2, 64] = 5.4, p < .01). Prospective memory failures were rated as having 
significantly greater future consequences than retrospective memory failures (p = .002, d = 
0.82). Unclassified memory and prospective memory failures were not significantly different 
though the contrast was marginal (p = .076, d = 0.58) and there was no difference between 
retrospective and unclassified memory failures (p = .34, d = 0.31). 
All incomplete activities and memory failures 
Finally, I combined the information from both the incomplete activities and memory 
failures checklists to compare the frequencies of memory and other more general cognitive 
failures (e.g., overload failures). For these analyses, I created a global index of prospective 
memory failures by adding the failures reported in the incomplete activities checklist with 
those reported in the memory failures checklist. This was the only category that included 
information from both cognitive failures questions. I then compared the frequencies of 
reported failures and the impact of these failures across four categories: overload, somatic, 
retrospective memory, and prospective memory. 
Comparing frequencies across all failures. 
As with the initial frequency analyses, I used a nonlinear mixed model to compare the 
frequency of failures across the four categories. There were significant differences across the 
categories, F(3, 384) = 8.27, p < .01, missed activities due to overload were reported more 
frequently than all other categories. The other categories (somatic, retrospective, and 
prospective) did not differ from one another (p's > .55). Risk ratios for missed activities due 
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to overload compared with the other categories were 2.28, 2.05, and 2.02 for somatic, 
retrospective, and prospective memory, respectively. 
Comparing impact across all failures. 
I then compared the impact indices across the four categories to determine whether 
there were any differences in the ratings of bothersome-ness, interference or anticipation of 
future consequences. There was no significant difference across these categories on the 
ratings of bothersome-ness (p = .68). There were differences across the categories on both 
interference (F[3, 145] = 2.85, p = .04) and future consequences (F[3, 145] = 4.34, p = .006). 
With respect to interference ratings, somatic failures were rated significantly more interfering 
than both retrospective memory failures (d = 0.55) and prospective memory failures (d = 
.40). Additionally, overload failures were rated as more interfering than retrospective 
memory failures (d = 0.34). For the ratings of future consequences, overload and prospective 
memory failures were perceived as having significantly greater future consequences than 
retrospective memory failures (d's = 0.68 and 1.02, respectively).  
Taken together these analyses imply that while missed activities due to overload are 
the most frequently reported, they are not considered more bothersome than other types of 
failures. Additionally, though the frequency of the somatic, prospective and retrospective 
memory categories were not significantly different from one another they do appear to have 
different perceived levels of impact on an individual's life. Missed activities due to somatic 
complaints are rated as more interfering than either of the memory failure categories.  
Following this broad examination of the frequency and impact of the different 
categories of missed activities and memory failures, I proceeded to the hypotheses outlined 
as part of Aim 1. The hypotheses associated with Aim 1 were designed to examine specific 
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differences in frequencies or impact of missed activities and memory failures and whether 
characteristics of the categories (e.g., routine vs. novel) or the individual (e.g., age) affect 
their frequency or impact. 
Hypotheses related to aim 1 
Hypothesis 1.  
Previous research on self-reported memory failures indicated that failures related to 
completing an intended action were most frequent (Crawford et al., 2003; Terry, 1988). To 
examine this I compared the frequency of self-reported prospective memory failures to the 
frequency of self-reported retrospective memory failures. For this comparison I used the 
overall index of prospective memory failures that included failures reported for incomplete 
activities as well as those reported in the memory failures question. There was no significant 
difference between the reporting frequencies of these two categories (p = .49) but there was a 
significant difference in the impact ratings for these two categories (p < .01). Prospective 
memory failures were rated significantly higher in anticipated future consequences compared 
with retrospective memory failures (d = 0.82). While the reporting frequencies of these two 
different types of failures did not differ significantly, it appears that they do differ in their 
impact on daily functioning. The differences found by previous research (Crawford et al., 
2003; Terry, 1988) may indicate that prospective memory failures are believed to be more 
frequent by participants because they have a greater impact on their daily activities.  
Hypothesis 2.  
The second hypothesis focused on the specific characteristics of memory failures and 
how these might affect reporting of cognitive failures. Research suggests that individuals are 
more likely to forget recently learned information compared with well known information 
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(Craik, 1994). In the current study, participants indicated whether or not the retrospective 
memory failure was for a recently learned or well-known item and identified the incomplete 
activities as part of their daily routine. To address the second hypothesis, I fit nonlinear 
mixed models separately to compare the rates of failures within a particular category to 
determine whether routine (or well-known) or not (recently learned) were more frequently 
reported. Risk ratios for this section are reported using non-routine activities (or recently 
learned information) as the reference. Ratios greater than 1 suggest that failures for routine 
activities are more likely while ratios below 1 suggest failures for non-routine activities were 
more likely. Table 8 includes all the relative frequencies and impact ratings for failures 
broken down by typicality. 
Comparing frequencies across failures depending on typicality.  
Retrospective memory failures. The first category I examined was retrospective 
memory failures for well-known compared with recently learned information. It is important 
to note that these analyses exclude the most frequently reported retrospective memory item: 
where I put something. Participants were not queried about the length of time they knew this 
information and while it could be assumed that this is a recently learned (or at least recently 
encoded) piece of information, it is possible that these failures represent a mixture of time 
periods (e.g., I forgot where I left the vacuum after I used it last week v. I forgot where I set 
my sunglasses down today). For this reason, I chose to exclude them from these analyses. As 
noted above, I used a nonlinear mixed model to compare the probability of reporting a well-
known opposed to a recently learned retrospective memory item. Contrary to expectations, 
failures for well-known information were more frequent than failures for recently learned 
information (F[1, 128] = 3.8, p = .05; RR = 1.75).  
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Missed activities due to overload, prospective memory, and somatic complaints. I 
then compared the probability of failures for routine and not routine activities for each of the 
other categories of failures. There was a significant difference in the frequency of missed 
activities due to overload with significantly more failures reported for non-routine activities 
compared to routine activities, F(1, 128) = 19.62, p < .01, RR = 0.61. On the other hand, 
participants reported missing more routine activities for both the somatic (F[1, 128] = 4.62, p 
= .03, RR = 1.38) and prospective memory categories (F[1, 128] = 9.89, p < .01; RR = 1.58, 
respectively). One possible explanation for these results is that more routine prospective 
memory and somatic activities are, by definition, attempted frequently and this would 
provide more opportunities for missing these types of activities.  
Comparing impact across failures depending on typicality. 
Retrospective memory failures. I also examined whether the characteristics of the 
reported failures affected the ratings of irritation, interference or anticipation of future 
consequences provided by participants. The only significant effect was for ratings of 
interference; memory failures for recently learned information were more interfering than 
failures for well-known information (F[1, 9] = 7.75, p = .02, d = 3.16).  
Missed activities due to overload, prospective memory, and somatic complaints. For 
the irritation ratings, only routine and not routine activities missed for somatic reasons 
received significantly different ratings with failures for routine activities causing greater 
irritation than failures for non-routine activities (F[1, 19] = 4.33, p = .05, d = 0.35). Missing a 
routine activity due to overload was more interfering than missing a non-routine activity 
(F[1, 32] = 6.06, p = .02, d = 0.74). There were no significant differences on any of the 
ratings of anticipated future consequences (all p's > .23). These findings indicate that missing 
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routine activities may have a greater impact on participants' daily functioning compared with 
missing non-routine activities.  
These results imply that asking participants for information about the nature of the 
failure could provide insight into which failures are perceived to create the most difficulties 
in daily functioning. These characteristics may also affect the relationship between failures 
and in-lab cognitive performance; a hypothesis that will be investigated further as part of 
Aim 3. 
Hypothesis 3. 
Hypothesis 3 was designed to examine whether age affected the frequency of 
reporting cognitive failures and the perceived impact of these failures when they were 
reported. To examine this, a main effect of age and the interaction between age and category 
of failure were added to the nonlinear mixed models comparing frequencies across the 
different categories of failures. When there was a significant age effect in these models I 
compared age groups by examining the estimated outcomes for adults one standard deviation 
below the mean age of the sample (from hereafter referred to as younger adults) and 
estimated outcomes for adults one standard deviation above the mean of the sample 
(hereafter referred to as older adults). Risk ratios were calculated using younger adults as the 
reference group (i.e., denominator). Risk ratios above 1 then indicate greater risk for older 
adults, while ratios under 1 indicate greater risk for younger adults. 
Comparing frequencies of incomplete activities across age. As with the initial models 
fit at the beginning of Aim 1, I began by comparing the frequency of failures from the 
incomplete activities items. This involved comparing the frequency of missed activities due 
to somatic, overload and prospective memory reasons across age. For this model, the main 
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effect of age was not significant, however, the age by category interaction was significant 
(F[2, 254] = 3.07, p = .048) indicating that age trajectories differed for each of the different 
categories of incomplete activities. Both missed activities due to overload and somatic 
complaints increased with age; older adults reported nearly twice as many missed activities 
of these types compared with younger adults (RRs = 2.4 and 1.71, respectively). Missed 
activities in the prospective memory category did not increase with age (RR = 0.76). This 
finding is consistent with some research suggesting that older adults perform just as well as 
younger adults on prospective memory tasks outside the lab (e.g., Dobbs & Rule, 1988).  
Comparing frequencies of memory failures across age. I then compared the 
retrospective, prospective, and general memory failures reported. For this model, the main 
effect of age (F[1, 254] = 7.05, p = .01) and the age by category interaction were significant 
(F[2, 254] = 6.38, p = .002) and indicated an age related increase in reporting of all types of 
memory failures though this was most pronounced for retrospective memory failures (RR = 
3.01). Prospective memory failures (RR = 1.6) and unclassified memory failures (RR = 1.25) 
also showed increases with age which is consistent with lab-based research suggesting that 
memory ability decreases with age across several different types of memory tasks (see Cohn, 
Emrich, & Moscovitch, 2008 and Old & Naveh-Benjamin, 2008 for reviews). This is in 
contrast to the research noted above indicating that older adults make fewer prospective 
memory failures outside the lab.  
One possible reason for these contradictory findings is that the items in the memory 
failures checklist thought to reflect prospective memory failures actually captured both 
prospective and retrospective memory failures. All prospective memory depends on 
retrospective memory to some extent (McDaniel & Einstein, 2007). For example, 
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remembering to go to the store to pick up milk can be seen as two memory tasks. 
Remembering to go to the store to get something would be defined as the prospective 
memory portion as it reflects the intention to perform an action. Recalling the item to be 
picked up at the store (i.e., milk) is a retrospective memory task. The memory failures 
checklist in the current study does not distinguish between the two components of these 
activities. A participant reporting they forgot an errand could have forgotten to start the 
errand (e.g., going to the store; a prospective memory failure) or forgotten the content of the 
errand (e.g., what to pick up from the store; a retrospective memory failure). Older adults 
may have more difficulty with the retrospective component causing them to report a failure 
for that item even though it was classified as a prospective memory item in the current study. 
These results suggest that older adults reported significantly more failures than 
younger adults across most of the categories of failures in the current study (the only 
exception being missed activities in the prospective memory category) and, in general, this 
did not depend on whether the failure reflected a routine or non-routine activity. Possibly 
more important than the frequency of failures is the impact individuals perceive these failures 
to have on their daily life. Because of this I then added age and the age by category 
interaction to the models comparing the ratings of irritation, interference, and anticipated 
future consequences. 
Comparing impact of incomplete activities across age. There were significant main 
effects of age for the comparison of the incomplete activities (F[1, 48] = 9.76, p < .01) on 
ratings of irritation. Older participants rated missed activities as less irritating than younger 
participants (Table 9). There were no significant age effects when comparing the incomplete 
activities categories on ratings of interference (p's > .11). For the ratings of future 
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consequences there was a significant main effect of age (F[1, 48] = 9.22, p < .01) which 
indicated that older adults rated missed activities as lower in future consequences compared 
with their younger counterparts (Table 9). 
Comparing impact of memory failures across age. There were no significant effects 
of age on irritation ratings or perceived future consequences for memory failures (p's > .15). 
For ratings of interference, the comparison of the interference ratings for failures from the 
memory failures checklist was significant (F[1, 62] = 5.28, p = .03). Again older participants 
rated their failures as less interfering than younger adults (Table 9).  
I also compared the ratings of impact across the routine and non-routine categories to 
determine whether these ratings were differentially affected by age however, there were no 
significant age by category interactions for any of the models (all p's > .16; Table 10).  
This is one way in which the method of reporting in the current study may help in 
getting a better estimate of the cognitive failures older adults experience. By asking about 
missed activities and memory failures each day for a week, older adults can remember more 
relevant events and provide a more accurate picture of their actual cognitive failures as well 
as the impact these failures are perceived to have on daily functioning. Unfortunately there 
were very few missed activities due to attention and concentration reported in the checklist 
about incomplete activities. However, as noted in the introduction, problems focusing 
attention may occur frequently throughout day but in fleeting moments without actually 
keeping individuals from performing daily activities. These moments still reflect failures of 
the individual to control their attention and may provide an index their ability to focus their 
thoughts. The assessment tools in the current study included a measure of daily cognitive 
interference which assesses the extent to which an individual can focus their thoughts on the 
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task at hand and control their experience of intrusive unproductive thoughts. Aim 2 examines 
the psychometric properties of the cognitive interference scale designed to capture failures of 
attention and concentration. 
Aim 2 
The cognitive interference rating scale was expected to assess a single, reliable 
construct and capture daily variability in attention failures within an individual as well as 
differences in attentional failures between individuals. Psychometric analyses were 
conducted to establish two major points. First, I calculated the reliability of within-person 
and between-person variability captured by the measure. Second, I determined whether a 
one-factor solution best fits the data both between individuals as well as within individuals 
across days. Finally, I investigated the discriminant validity of the scale by examining its 
relationship to the construct of negative affect (Stawski et al., in review). Establishing that 
the scale has adequate psychometric characteristics is a critical first step for any scale 
intended to differentiate between individuals but also within an individual across days. 
Verifying that the variability captured by the measure is reliable at the within-person level 
allows researchers to be confident that the variability in responses is not due to the items used 
or random error.  
Before beginning the psychometric analyses, I fit a series of multilevel linear mixed 
models to the data to extract the between and within person variability. I then calculated the 
intraclass correlation (ICC), an index of the percentage of between person variability relative 
to the total variability, for each of the items as well as the total score. The ICCs for the items 
as well as the total score appear in Table 11. Approximately 61-68% of the variability in the 
items was due to between person differences in cognitive interference, while 77% of 
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variability in the total score was due to between person differences. Additionally, I examined 
models using day in study to predict scores on the items as well as total score to determine 
whether participant responding changed as the study period progressed. It is possible that 
asking participants about their cognitive interference caused reactivity; participants may 
begin to pay more attention to their thoughts and be more mindful of intrusions. There was a 
significant main effect of day in study on item 8 (F[6, 621] = 2.22, p = .04). Average 
responses on this item for the first day in the study were 2.54 (out of 7) compared with 2.17 
on the last day in the study. There was also a marginally significant day in study effect on 
item 3 (F[6, 621] = 1.97, p = .07). Again average responses on this item decreased slightly 
over the course of the study, first day M = 2.56 v. last day M = 2.49. There were no other 
significant main effects (p’s > .21). The effect of day in study was further investigated with 
Generalizability theory models which will be described next. 
 After determining that variability existed at both the between and within person 
levels among the items as well as in total scores, I addressed the hypotheses related to Aim 2. 
Hypotheses related to aim 2 
Hypothesis 4.  
For the first hypothesis of aim 2, I used generalizabilty theory models (SAS proc 
varcomp) to calculate the amount of variability in the items due to inter- and intraindividual 
differences in cognitive interference. Generalizability theory (G-theory) uses techniques 
similar to analysis of variance (ANOVA) to partition the variance in scores into a variety of 
different sources, referred to in G-theory as facets. Using G-theory models I was able to 
decompose the variability in the daily measure of cognitive interference into variance related 
to items, persons, days, and the interactions of each. Any variability not accounted for by 
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these sources was considered error. For these models, I followed the procedures outlined by 
Cranford and colleagues (2006). The G-theory models in the current study were estimated 
using the MIVQUE0 method in order to allow the use of data from participants who did not 
complete all 7 evening assessments in the current study. Item was treated as a fixed factor as 
the items in the current study represent the complete set of available items for the daily 
assessment of cognitive interference at this time. For the first reliability estimate, day was 
constrained to be fixed and person as well as all higher order interactions with person were 
treated as random factors. The reliability estimates generated from this variance 
decomposition then refers to any person measured on a given day. For the second estimate of 
between-person reliability, the G-theory model was re-estimated treating day as a random 
factor as well as person. This means that the reliability estimates produced from these 
variance estimates will refer to a random individual assessed on a random day.  
The full results of the G-theory models appear in Table 12. As indicated by the ICCs, 
much of the variance is due to differences between individuals (~53%) and the remaining 
variability is mostly accounted for by differences within persons across days (~15%) and 
within person differences in responding to the different items (~9%). Although the mixed 
models fit earlier found significant effects for day in study, day in study accounted for 
relatively little variance in the data as a main effect (.09%) or as an interaction with item 
(.03%).  
Computing between- and within-person reliability estimates. Cranford and colleagues 
(2006) proposed three equations (see equations 1-3) for quantifying reliable variance at the 
between and within person levels using the variance components estimated in the G-theory 
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models. The calculation of these estimates and the values in the current study are described 
below. 
Between-person reliability was calculated as the percentage of variability due to 
persons and the person by item interaction (indicating that different individuals may vary in 
their responses the individual items) divided by those terms plus the estimated variability 
related to error (see Equation 1). When between-person reliability was calculated this way, 
the estimated reliability was .981. This indicates that scores on the measure reflect relatively 
stable individual differences in cognitive interference. 
Within-person reliability was then calculated as the person by day interaction divided 
by this same term plus the estimated variance due to error (see Equation 2). This coefficient 
allowed the evaluation of the amount of reliable variance due to change within-persons 
across days in the study. That is, it quantifies whether there is reliable interindividual 
variability in intraindividual change across days. Using the variance decomposition estimates 
from the model assuming day as a fixed factor the within-person reliability was estimated to 
.849 implying that this measure was able to reliably assess systematic change in cognitive 
interference within an individual.  
One limitation to these analyses is that day was treated as a fixed effect rather than 
random. This implies that the reliability coefficient derived would only apply if all 
individuals were measured on the same fixed day. I estimated G-theory models treating both 
day and person (as well as all higher order interactions involving these factors) as random to 
estimate reliability coefficients that would account for the fact that subsequent research will 
use new individuals (person random effect) and assess them on different days (day random 
effect). Equation 3 is an extension of equation 1 treating day as a random rather than fixed 
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effect. This equation includes day and the day by person interaction in the denominator to 
account for these additional sources of variability when day is treated as a random effect. The 
inclusion of these additional effects reduced the between-person reliability to .746 in the 
current study. The reduction in the reliability estimate indicates that the ability of the 
measure to differentiate between individuals when individuals are measured on different days 
is lower though still in the acceptable range. However, estimating within-person reliability 
within the random effects model left the estimate relatively unchanged at .85 indicating the 
measure reliably discriminates within an individual across days regardless of the day of 
measurement. 
These reliability estimates indicate that reliable variance exists in the cognitive 
interference measure at both the within and between person levels. The scale appears to be 
capturing both differences between persons as well as differences within a person across 
days. The next step was then to examine the factor structure of the scale, particularly 
focusing on the unidimensionality of the scale. 
Hypothesis 5.  
I conducted a multi-level exploratory factor analysis (using Mplus) to determine 
whether a one factor solution best fit the data at both the between- and within-person levels. 
The number of factors was evaluated in three ways. First, I examined the scree plot graphing 
the eigenvalues for the extracted factors to determine whether a one factor solution appears to 
describe the data. The graph of these values appears in Figure 1. For the between-person 
analysis, there was a clear one factor solution. This is supported by the scree plot as well as 
applying Kaiser’s rule to the eigenvalues and the factor loadings (Table 13). For the within-
person solution however, there is a possible two factor solution. Two of the eigenvalues are 
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above 1, the first factor accounting for 44.5% of the variance and the second accounting for 
13% of the variance. Examining the model fits, a multilevel model constraining the between 
structure to one factor and the within structure to two factors fit the data significantly better 
than a model with one factor at each level, χ2diff(8) = 254.58, p < .0001. The TLI and RMSEA 
also indicated that this model fit the data well. The TLI was .913, which exceeds the .9 
criterion for this index suggested by Bentler (1990). The RMSEA for the between-level 
model was .04 and.03 for the within-level model, both below the .05 criterion that indicates 
excellent model fit (Browne & Cudeck, 1992). Inspection of the factor loadings indicated 
that items 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6 loaded on the first factor, items 7, 8, and 9 loaded significantly on 
the second factor. Item 5 had equivalent loadings on both factors. Item content suggested that 
the first factor reflected the experience of intrusive thoughts (e.g., think about personal 
worries) while the second factor includes items assessing attempts to control and avoid 
intrusive thoughts (e.g., try to put problems out of your mind). Although item 5 loaded on 
both factors, the content of this item (i.e., try to avoid certain thoughts) implied that it 
belonged on the second factor. The correlation between these factors was .686, p < .0001. 
The finding of two factors at the within level was unexpected but the solution offers 
insight into the underlying processes captured by the scale. The scale appears more than 
adequate for tracking changes in cognitive interference within an individual across days. The 
two factor solution indicated that the scale was able to differentiate the two major facets of 
cognitive interference (experience and avoidance) at the within-person level. At the between-
person level, the one factor solution differentiates among levels of ability of these processes 
combined. The final step for examining the psychometrics of this measure was to establish 
the discriminant validity of the cognitive interference scale. It was particularly important to 
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determine whether the cognitive interference scale was capturing attempts and failures of 
thought control or a more general construct related to that person’s mood that day. On days 
when an individual reports experiencing higher negative affect, they may also report 
difficulties with concentration and thinking about personal worries. The cognitive 
interference scale was intended to capture attentional failures in general, not simply those 
related to negative affect. 
Hypothesis 6. 
The construct of cognitive interference assessed in the current study is closely related 
to that of rumination, a construct that has been used to characterize depression (Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2000). What differentiates cognitive interference from rumination is a lack of 
emphasis on negative affect and a more general focus on distracting or unwanted thoughts 
and attempts to control these thoughts. In order to establish that the cognitive interference 
scale assessed this broader construct, I examined the relationship between this scale and the 
negative affect scale administered as part of the evening assessment. 
Using a multilevel confirmatory factor analysis, I fit two models to the negative affect 
and cognitive interference data (Table 14). The first of these models assumed that all of the 
items would load on a single factor. The second model assumed two different factors at the 
between person level (one for negative affect and one for cognitive interference) and three 
factors at the within person level: two factors for cognitive interference as suggested by the 
multilevel exploratory factor analysis in hypothesis 5 and one factor for the negative affect 
items at the within person level. Because these models are nested, model fit was assessed 
using the amount of change in the chi-square statistic between the two models. Comparing 
these models indicated that the model constraining the negative affect and cognitive 
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interference to load on separate factors fit the data significantly better, χ2diff(4) = 878.33, p < 
.0001. This implies that negative affect and cognitive interference form distinctly different 
factors in this model.  
I performed similar tests using the negative affect reports from each of the beeped 
assessments throughout the day as well as the average of the negative affect items for the 
beeped assessments. This resulted in fitting 10 additional models: 2 for each of the 5 beeped 
assessments, one constraining all the items to load on a single factor and a second allowing 
negative affect and cognitive interference to load on separate factors. The chi-square fits for 
these models appear in Table 14. In no case did the one factor model fit the data better than 
the two factor model. These findings were confirmed by the other model fit statistics. For the 
one factor models the TLI ranged from .351 to .652, well below the .9 criterion for adequate 
model fit. Similarly the RMSEA indices were all above .1 indicating poor model fit. The 
models allowing negative affect and cognitive interference to load on separate factors had 
TLI fits from .91 to .932 all indicating good model fit. The RMSEAs for these models also 
indicated an excellent fit to the data as all were below .05. Finally, I examined the 
correlations between negative affect and cognitive interference factors. These correlations 
were high at the between-person level (r's = .61 to .75) indicating that individuals who tended 
to experience more cognitive interference also tended to report more negative affect. The 
correlations at the within person level were smaller; correlations with the interference factor 
ranged from .22 to .54 and correlations with the avoidance factor ranged from .12 to .39. The 
highest correlations among the factors were found with the negative affect data collected at 
the evening assessment, the only time when negative affect and cognitive interference were 
assessed concurrently.  
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These analyses provide support for the cognitive interference scale having adequate 
psychometric properties at both the between- and within-person levels. The scale taps 
reliable variability at both levels and a supportable factor analytic model fit the data well 
showing that the scale was sensitive to the major facets of cognitive interference at the 
within-person level while differentiating individuals on the construct at the between-person 
level. The final analyses established the discriminant validity of cognitive interference from 
negative affect indicating that the cognitive interference scale is capturing variability related 
to an individual's cognitive state outside of their actual mood. Although individuals who 
report more negative affect were more likely to report more cognitive interference, the 
relationship at the between-person level never approached a correlation higher than .75 and 
the relationships at the within-person level were small to moderate at best. These results 
indicate that the cognitive interference scale and scores derived from the items are 
psychometrically valid in that they appear to reliably reflect the construct that I intended to 
assess at the outset of the study. In aim 3 further analyses will be conducted to examine the 
construct validity of this scale as well as the missed activities and memory failures checklists 
to determine how the events reported in this study relate to in-lab cognitive performance. 
Aim 3 
The final aim of the current study focused on the construct validity of the daily 
cognitive failures questionnaire. In the current study, participants completed a battery of lab-
based cognitive tasks that tapped working memory, episodic memory, and fluid intelligence. 
One of the hurdles of assessing self-reported cognitive failures is establishing a relationship 
between self-reports and actual cognitive performance. Previous research on daily self-
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reported cognitive failures has not looked at whether performance on in-lab cognitive tasks is 
related to daily self-reports. 
Before examining whether self-reported cognitive failures were related to cognitive 
performance, I determined whether it was appropriate to create composite scores for each of 
the cognitive constructs measured in the current study. I first examined the correlations 
among the cognitive performance tasks and found that tasks within each of the constructs 
(working memory, episodic memory, and fluid intelligence) were significantly correlated and 
in general these correlations were higher within a construct compared with correlations 
across constructs (Table 15). I then fit an exploratory factor analytic model to the data to 
determine whether the tasks formed three separable factors. Given previous relationships of 
these constructs the factor solution allowed the factors to be correlated using a Promax 
rotation. This model extracted three factors with a eigenvalues greater than 1. Upon 
inspection of the factor loadings, the tasks loaded as expected with the working memory 
tasks loading on one factor, the episodic memory tasks loading on the second factor, and the 
fluid intelligence tasks loading on the final factor. Some tasks did crossload on other factors 
but this was expected given the correlated nature of these constructs (Table 16); all tasks had 
their highest loading on their hypothesized factor.  
 After establishing that these tasks did appear to tap three separable constructs, I then 
created composite scores for each individual by standardizing scores on each task and then 
taking the sum of these standardized scores as an index of each of the different abilities. 
These composite scores were then used to determine whether self-reported cognitive failures 
were related to in-lab cognitive performance. First, I examined the Spearman correlations 
among the composite scores and the frequency of failures for each of the different categories 
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(Table 17). For this analysis, the frequencies were adjusted for response rate by dividing the 
total number of failures reported in a given category by the number of evening surveys 
correctly completed. These correlations suggested that the episodic memory composite score 
was significantly related to reports of retrospective memory failures and missed activities due 
to overload and the working memory composite was significantly related to the reporting of 
missed activities due to somatic complaints. These relationships were small at best 
suggesting only a weak relationship between cognitive performance and self-reported 
cognitive failures. 
Hypotheses related to Aim 3 
Hypothesis 7. 
The next step was to fit nonlinear mixed models using cognitive performance to 
predict missed activities and memory failures. As with the models comparing frequency of 
missed activities and memory failures across categories, these models also included 
neuroticism to control for differences in reporting and cognitive performance due to 
personality. I fit models to test whether each of the three composite scores was related to 
self-reports of missed activities and memory failures. Where there were significant effects I 
examined these effects by calculating the predicted outcomes for individuals of low and high 
ability defined as one standard deviation below and above the average. Unless otherwise 
specified risk ratios for these models were computed using high ability individuals as the 
reference group. Risk ratios over 1 indicate greater risk for low ability individuals while 
ratios below 1 indicate greater risk for high ability individuals.  
Predicting cognitive failures with cognitive performance. In the first model using 
working memory to predict frequency of reports in the four categories of missed activities 
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and memory failures (overload, somatic, retrospective memory and prospective memory), 
there was a significant category by working memory composite interaction (F[3, 381] = 4.24, 
p < .01). This indicated that the relationship between working memory and failures depended 
upon the category of failure being reported. Further examination of this finding indicated that 
higher working memory scores were related to reporting fewer somatic failures (p = .01) 
however, there were no other significant relationships (p's > .10). A risk ratio comparing 
frequency of missed of activities due to somatic complaints for high and low WM ability 
individuals was 1.43. Next, predicting frequency of failures with the composite score for 
episodic memory there was a significant main effect of episodic memory performance (F[1, 
381] = 16.82, p < .0001). Higher episodic memory performance was related to reporting 
fewer retrospective memory failures and fewer missed activities due to somatic complaints 
(p's < .01; RRs = 1.51 and 1.64). Episodic memory performance was also marginally related 
to missed activities due to overload (p = .06); again higher performance predicted fewer 
reported overload failures (RR = 1.24). Finally, the fluid intelligence composite score was 
not significantly related to reported failures either as a main effect or as part of an interaction 
(all p's > .14).  
Age as a moderator between self-reported cognition and cognitive performance. Age 
did not moderate any of the relationships between self-reported missed activities, memory 
failures, and cognitive performance with one exception. Including age in the model with 
episodic memory as a predictor of failures led to a significant three way interaction of age, 
episodic memory, and category (F[3, 375] = 3.94, p < .01). The interaction indicated that 
episodic memory ability was more predictive of the frequency of failures in younger adults 
compared with older adults.  
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Predicting atypical and typical failures with cognitive performance. Another potential 
moderator could be characteristics of the failures themselves. To test this, I also examined 
whether the relationship between cognitive performance and the categories of failures broken 
down by routine and non-routine failures. Again typicality did not moderate the relationship 
except in the case of missed activities due to somatic complaints. For working memory there 
was a significant interaction with typicality; working memory significantly predicted missed 
activities due to somatic complaints only for activities classified as not routine (RR = 1.67).  
These results imply that, consistent with previous research, the relationships between 
cognitive performance and self-reported cognitive failures are small regardless of 
characteristics of the person and of the failures. Although cognitive performance was a 
significant predictor of some self-reported missed activities and memory failures, most of the 
categories were not predicted by cognitive performance. None of the cognitive composite 
scores significantly predicted missed activities due to overload regardless of whether the 
missed activity was routine or not routine. The most common finding was that cognitive 
ability was related to missed activities due to somatic reasons: better ability was related to 
fewer reported missed activities. This may imply a greater relationship between cognitive 
performance and health rather than an important relationship between cognitive failures and 
cognitive performance as somatic complaints are a non-cognitive reasons for missing an 
activity. Possible reasons for these poor relationships will be discussed in detail in the 
discussion section. 
Hypothesis 8. 
A further set of analyses was conducted to examine whether the temporal proximity 
of the assessments of failures affected their relationship with objective cognitive 
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performance. Failures reported closer in time to the second in-lab session (when the cognitive 
tasks were administered) might show differential relationships compared with those reported 
farther away in time. To test this hypothesis I included the cross-level interaction between 
day in study (time) and the composite score representing cognitive ability. However, there 
was no significant interaction between day in study and cognitive performance for any of the 
categories of failures (p's > .11). This implies that the relationship between cognitive 
performance and self-reports of cognitive failures did not depend on whether the failures 
were reported closer to or farther from when the reports occurred.  
Hypothesis 9. 
After attempting to relate the counts of self-reported missed activities and memory 
failures to cognitive performance, I also examined the relationship between the Likert-style 
scale assessing failures of thought control and cognitive performance. As with the analyses 
for hypothesis 7, I used composite scores representing each of the three cognitive ability 
variables to predict scores on the cognitive interference scale. I created a sum score for the 
entire scale but because the analyses in Aim 2, hypothesis 5 suggested that a two factor 
structure best fit the data at the within person level, I also created two subscale scores to 
determine whether the relationship between cognitive performance and cognitive interference 
was more related to the experience of intrusive thoughts (intrusions subscale) or the 
individual's attempts to avoid and suppress these thoughts (avoidance subscale). Before 
fitting mixed models to these data, I examined the correlations between the cognitive 
interference scores and the cognitive performance composites (Table 18). These correlations 
were generally weak and only episodic memory was significantly correlated with total scores 
and scores on the intrusions subscale. 
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Predicting cognitive interference with cognitive performance. To examine these 
relationships I fit multilevel linear mixed models using cognitive performance to predict the 
cognitive interference score. Working memory was not significantly related to any of the 
cognitive interference scores (p's > .12). Similarly, fluid intelligence was not related to 
overall scores nor the subscale scores (p's > .09). Episodic memory did significantly predict 
total scores on the cognitive interference scale, specifically individuals with better episodic 
memory ability had higher cognitive interference scores, F(1, 129) = 4.22, p = .04. However, 
when examining the effect of episodic memory and the subscale scores, episodic memory 
was significantly related to reported intrusions (F[1, 129] = 4.83, p = .03) but only 
marginally related to avoidance (F[1, 129] = 3.14, p = .07). Estimated means for each level 
of ability appear in Table 19. 
Predicting cognitive interference with cognitive performance across age. I then added 
age to each of these models to determine whether age affected the relationship between 
cognitive interference and cognitive performance. For all of these models, age was 
significantly related to cognitive interference total scores and subscale scores such that older 
adults reported less cognitive interference, both on the intrusions subscale and the avoidance 
subscale (all p's < .01; Table 20). Age interacted with episodic memory performance to 
predict both total scores (F[1, 124] = 3.98, p = .05) and scores on the intrusion subscale (F[1, 
124] = 4.47, p = .04). For younger adults, higher episodic memory ability was related to 
higher cognitive interference total scores and higher scores on the intrusions subscale 
however this effect was reversed for older adults; higher episodic memory ability was related 
to lower scores on both (Table 21). No other age by cognitive performance interactions were 
significant (p's > .13). 
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Hypothesis 10. 
The last set of proposed analyses also examined whether the temporal proximity of 
the cognitive interference assessment to the cognitive testing affected the relationship 
between cognitive performance and cognitive interference. As with the analyses in 
hypothesis 8, it may be that assessments completed closer in time to the cognitive testing 
session are more related to cognitive performance than those completed farther away in time. 
To test this, I added day in study to each of the models and examined the cross-level 
interaction between cognitive performance and day in study. Day in study did not interact 
with working memory performance to predict any of the cognitive interference scores (p's > 
.13). The interaction between episodic memory performance and day in study was significant 
for cognitive interference total scores, F(6, 614) = 2.84, p = .01 and avoidance subscale 
scores, F(6, 614) = 3.72, p < .01. This effect implied that assessments completed in the 
middle of the study period (i.e., days 2-5) were more related to episodic memory 
performance compared to days at the end of the study. The interaction was not significant for 
the intrusions subscale (p = .20). With regard to the models using fluid intelligence to predict 
cognitive interference, the interaction between day in study and fluid intelligence was 
significant in predicting scores on the avoidance subscale (F[1, 615] = 3.00, p < .01) though 
not the total scores or the intrusions subscale (p's > .10). Assessments completed in the 
beginning and middle of the week were more related to fluid intelligence performance 
compared with assessments completed at the end of the study period. 
I also examined models including cognitive performance, day in study as well as age 
to predict cognitive interference. In none of these models was the day in study interaction 
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with age or the three-way interaction with age, performance, and day in study significant (p's 
> .22). 
These models again suggested small relationships between cognitive performance and 
daily self-reported cognitive failures. Although episodic memory was significantly related to 
cognitive interference, working memory was not as previous research would suggest 
(Stawski et al., 2006). This may have been related to the measures that make up the working 
memory construct in the current study and will be discussed in detail in the discussion 
section.  
Supplemental analyses examining the construct validity of cognitive interference 
Given that the relationships between cognitive performance and cognitive 
interference were small, to provide additional evidence of construct validity for the cognitive 
interference scale I also used the trait measures of cognitive interference administered in the 
study to predict daily reports of cognitive interference. Showing that daily reports of intrusive 
thinking are related to global trait assessments would provide evidence that the daily reports 
taken outside the lab are tapping a similar construct as that assessed using validated measures 
in the lab. In the current study, participants completed the Thought Occurrence questionnaire, 
the Impact of Events scale, the White Bear Suppression inventory, and the punishment and 
worry subscales of the Thought Control questionnaire. All of these questionnaires 
significantly predicted scores on the cognitive interference total scores and both subscale 
scores (all p's < .02). In all cases, higher scores on the trait measure were related to higher 
daily self-reports of cognitive interference in general, as well as both subscales (Table 22). 
These relationships also did not depend on age (all p's > .2). 
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These trait questionnaires were completed prior to the seven days of daily 
assessments. As with the cognitive performance analyses, it is possible that assessments 
completed closer in time to the completion of the trait measures might be more strongly 
related than those completed farther away in time. I included day in study in all of the models 
to determine whether the cross-level interaction was significant. Only one of these 
interactions was significant. Using the Thought Occurrence questionnaire and day in study to 
predict scores on the intrusions factor indicated that assessments completed in the middle of 
the week were more related to trait scores compared to those completed at the beginning and 
end of the week (F[6, 604] = 2.12, p = .05). All other interactions did not reach significance 
(p's > .09). I also added age to these models but there were no significant age by day in study 
or age, day in study, and trait measure interactions (p's > .27). These analyses provide 
additional evidence of the construct validity for the daily reports of cognitive interference. 
Discussion 
Summary of results 
 An age-diverse sample of participants completed seven days of daily assessments as 
well as a battery of cognitive tests and personality measures. During the daily assessments, 
participants reported on activities they did not complete, any memory failures they 
experienced, and their perception of their ability to control their thoughts that day. The main 
goal of the current study was to examine and validate these assessment tools for the 
measurement of cognitive failures to determine whether they are appropriate for use in daily 
diary studies. 
 For Aim 1 overload failures were most frequently reported but had less perceived 
impact on daily functioning compared with missed activities due to non-cognitive reasons, 
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that is somatic complaints. Importantly, frequency and impact of reported failures did depend 
on typicality of the failures. Older adults reported significantly more missed activities and 
memory failures across categories but found these events less irritating, less interfering and 
less likely to be related to future consequences than younger adults. 
 Aim 2 found that the cognitive interference questionnaire assessed reliable variance at 
both the between and within person levels. The factor structure suggested a unidimensional 
scale between-persons and a two factor scale within-persons indicating good discrimination 
of the processes involved in cognitive interference at the within-level. This scale tapped a 
construct distinct from negative affect providing evidence of discriminant validity for the 
scale. 
 The final aim demonstrated that, consistent with previous research on self-reported 
cognitive failures, there were weak relationships among objective cognitive performance 
measures and daily self-reported cognitive failures. Higher episodic memory performance 
scores were significantly related to lower reports of certain types of missed activities and 
memory failures however the other measures of cognitive performance were not. These 
relationships did not depend on age or the characteristics of the reported events themselves. 
Lower episodic memory ability was also related to greater reports of unproductive repetitive 
thoughts but only in older adults.  
 Discussion of the results will begin with the findings from aim 1; specifically the 
frequency and impact of daily cognitive failures and implications for current research in the 
area. 
Frequency and impact of cognitive failures 
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 Results from the current study provide more detailed information regarding the 
relative frequency perceived impact of daily missed activities and memory failures compared 
with previous research. Research has yet to incorporate measures of perceived impact of 
daily cognitive failures on an individual's functioning. Assessing impact as well as frequency 
allowed the current study to begin to investigate which daily missed activities and memory 
failures were most frequently reported but also which had the greatest perceived impact on an 
individual's ability to meet daily cognitive demands. Previous research had suggested that 
prospective memory failures would be the most frequently reported memory failure outside 
the lab (Terry, 1988). This is coupled with the belief that these failures will be associated 
with significant personal consequences (McDaniel & Einstein, 2007; Reason, 1984), though 
this had not been tested empirically. Data in the current study suggests that prospective 
memory failures are in fact not reported more frequently than retrospective memory failures. 
Instead the only difference between prospective memory and retrospective memory failures 
was the ratings of anticipated future consequences.  
 Differences in the perceived consequences of prospective and retrospective memory 
failures suggests two reasons why previous research has found that prospective memory 
failures were more frequent. First, because of the research and theorizing on the importance 
of prospective memory in daily life (see McDaniel & Einstein, 2007), previous efforts aimed 
at studying everyday cognitive failures have focused primarily on prospective memory 
failures. For example, the 10-item measure developed by Whitbourne and colleagues (2008) 
includes 5 items assessing prospective memory failures. This oversampling of prospective 
memory failures compared with retrospective memory failures would lead to the misleading 
conclusion that prospective memory failures are more common simply because participants 
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have more opportunities to report on those failures. Second, in order for a participant to 
report on a daily cognitive failure they must first notice that they have even experienced a 
failure. Following noticing the failure they must also be able to recall the failure when 
actually filling out the questionnaire (Rabbitt & Abson, 1990). Failures associated with 
greater future consequences would be more likely to be remembered when the participant is 
filling out a questionnaire. Therefore, because prospective memory failures have a greater 
impact on daily life, they are more likely to be reported on self-report measures of cognitive 
failures when participants retrospect over long periods of time. The shorter time frame in the 
current study allowed participants to depend less on biased memory processes to recall 
failures. 
 This stresses the importance of the reporting interval for cognitive failures. To be 
recalled, the memories of cognitive failures must be retained until the participant completes 
the questionnaire. The research suggesting that prospective memory failures are most 
frequent in everyday life used long reporting intervals which likely forced participants to 
attempt to recall their failures over weeks and months. Researchers hypothesize that global 
self-reports like these are based more on a participant's beliefs about their memory; beliefs 
that are formed by those failures that can be remembered rather than all instances of failures 
(Cavanaugh et al., 1998). Because prospective memory failures have a greater impact on the 
individual's daily functioning, they are more likely to be remembered and reported on global 
reports of cognitive failures. On the other hand, retrospective memory failures may be 
underreported due to their relatively lower impact. The current study used a shorter reporting 
interval (i.e., during the day today) which might have allowed participants to better recall 
their retrospective memory failures while completing the assessment. This might also explain 
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why the current study found no difference in the frequencies of prospective and retrospective 
memory failures. The shorter reporting interval supported recall of failures of both types of 
memory failures rather than capturing just those failures that are most memorable (i.e., 
prospective memory failures). This shortened interval reduced the recall bias associated with 
prospective memory failures and likely provided a more accurate description of the relative 
frequency of memory failures in daily life. 
 The current study also permitted a closer look at specific types of retrospective 
memory failures, that is, whether the failure occurred for recently learned or well-known 
information. Previous research on self-reported cognitive failures has tended not to 
distinguish between the nature of the information forgotten in this way but lab-based research 
would suggest that well-known information would be less likely to be forgotten compared 
with recently learned information (Craik, 1994). In the current study, however, participants 
reported more failures for well-known information. This was in contrast to the impact ratings 
which indicated that forgetting well-known information was more interfering with daily 
activities. One possible reason for the difference in frequency is that well-known information 
is accessed more often than recently learned information so there are more opportunities for 
failures. The impact ratings indicate that forgetting a piece of recently learned information, 
though less common, causes greater problems in daily life. Importantly this suggests that 
memory training programs and aids (e.g., Rebok, Carlson, & Langbaum, 2007) should target 
recently learned information rather than well-known information. In this way ratings of 
impact can assist in directing interventions toward remediating those failures that create the 
most difficulty in everyday life. This focused approach to designing interventions to improve 
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everyday cognitive functioning could increase the effectiveness of training programs outside 
the lab (c.f. Jobe et al., 2001). 
 A potential limitation of these findings is that the end of day reporting strategy used 
in the current study is still subject to some degree of forgetting and reappraisal. The current 
study did not probe when failures actually occurred throughout the day and it is likely that 
failures that occurred farther away in time from the end of the day assessment were less 
likely to be recalled compared with those closer in time. One remedy for this is to have 
participants report failures as they occur throughout the day (cf. Yamanaka, 2003). 
Unfortunately, reappraisal of the failure can play a role even over these shortened reporting 
intervals. Participants may reframe failures at the time of reporting to preserve their beliefs 
about their cognitive abilities (Cavanaugh et al., 1998).  
 This emphasizes a possible benefit of the approach in the current study. Previous 
research on daily cognitive failures used items framed such that the participant had to admit 
having problems with cognitive activities (Neupert et al., 2006a; 2006b; Whitbourne et al., 
2008). Admitting problems with cognitive functioning has negative implications and 
connontations for all individuals and older adults may be particularly sensitive to this as 
inability to complete cognitive activities of daily living can impact their ability to live 
independently (Reese & Cherry, 2004; 2006). In the current study, a participant could report 
missing activities because they were instead too tired, too ill or had to deal with a more 
important activity rather than simply admitting they had difficulty. They were also given an 
opportunity to indicate the extent to which the missed activity or memory failure impacted 
their day which may have encouraged reporting from participants; they could report 
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forgetting something but also indicate that the memory failure would not have future 
consequences.  
Effects of age on frequency and impact of cognitive failures 
 Previous research had found that older adults do not report more daily cognitive 
failures than younger adults (Neupert et al., 2006a; 2006b; Whitbourne et al., 2008). 
However, consistent with lab-based research on cognitive performance (Burgess et al., 2006; 
Cohn, Emrich, & Moscovitch, 2008; Old & Naveh-Benjamin, 2008) older adults reported 
poorer daily cognitive functioning than younger adults in the current study. Importantly, 
older adults were less bothered by their failures, considered them less interfering, and less 
likely to be related to future consequences. Taken together these findings begin to provide 
some explanation for the inconsistent findings in the current study and previous research 
(Whitbourne et al., 2008). There are three general reasons the findings in the current study 
differ from previous research. First, the shorter reporting interval may aid in the recall of 
failures at the time of reporting. Second, previous research has provided a limited number of 
examples of failures and framed these failures in ways that may threaten older adults. Third, 
older adults place less importance on their failures making them less likely to be recalled. 
Each of these points will be discussed in detail below. 
 Finding that older adults report more failures than younger adults is in contrast to 
other self-report studies using global self-reports of failures and finding no age differences 
(Hertzog et al., 2000; Reese & Cherry, 2007). One potential reason for the difference in 
findings is the shortened reporting interval in the current study. Rabbitt and Abson (1990) 
noted that "individuals with poorer memories are more likely to 'forget that they forget'" (p. 
3), an effect that may be more important as individuals age. Lab evidence shows that even in 
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normal aging, older adults are experiencing some degree of memory loss (Cohn, Emrich, & 
Moscovitch, 2008; Old & Naveh-Benjamin, 2008). This memory loss then makes it more 
difficult for them to remember what they have forgotten leading to an underreporting of 
cognitive failures. This effect is compounded as poorer memory leads to both more failures 
as well as more failures being forgotten. As adults age then, their accuracy of self-reporting 
memory failures becomes impaired, particularly when reporting over long intervals of time. 
Shortening the reporting interval can assist with this problem by reducing the interval 
between the occurrence of the failure and reporting but does not completely eliminate it as 
evidenced by the findings of Whitbourne and colleagues (2008; see also Neupert et al., 
2006).  
 The current study extended the range of failures assessed and allowed participants to 
report on any missed activity regardless of why it was incomplete. Whitbourne and 
colleagues (2008) focused their cognitive failures assessment on memory failures in general 
and prospective memory failures in particular. While this focus is appropriate given previous 
research suggesting that prospective memory failures are common in everyday life (Crawford 
et al., 2003; Harris, 1984; Terry, 1988) and a primary concern among older adults (Kleigl & 
Martin, 2003), it also limits the scope of failures that can be reported by the individual. The 
current study allowed participants to report on a wider range of failures and included an 
"other" option for activities and memory failures that did not seem to fit in the other 
categories. Additionally, as noted earlier, framing events as missed activities rather than as 
mental mistakes may have encouraged participants, particularly older adults, to report events 
separate from the negative appraisals of those events. Similarly, older participants could also 
indicate that although a failure had occurred it had not negatively impacted their daily 
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activities, effectively indicating that their cognitive failures were not necessarily impairing 
their functioning.  
 The age effects on the impact ratings provide a third reason for previous findings of 
no age differences in self-reported cognitive failures. Older adults may actually experience 
more failures outside the lab than they report because these failures are not associated with 
meaningful consequences in their daily life. Failures that do not have an impact on daily life 
may be less likely to be noticed and remembered. Additionally older adults may place less 
importance on the impact that failures have on their daily life. Socioemotional selectivity 
theory proposes that older adults place more importance on social relationships and positive 
emotional experiences while reducing the importance placed on the cognitive aspects of their 
life (Carstensen, 1995). The impact data from the current study support this idea with the 
finding that older adults reported less irritation, less interference, and fewer consequences 
from their failures despite the fact that they report significantly more failures. If older adults 
place less importance on their cognitive failures they may be less motivated to remember 
their failures and, by virtue of this, less able to report on these failures. Additionally, the 
current study allowed older adults to report events as well as the impact of these events. 
Older adults may have felt more comfortable reporting a cognitive failure when they could 
also indicate that this failure had little to no impact on their daily functioning. The lack of age 
effects in previous studies might be partially due to older adults remembering fewer failures 
in general as they complete assessments of cognitive failures regardless of when the 
assessment occurs.  
Limitations of assessing failure subtypes 
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 Allowing participants to report on the "reason" they missed an activity is a novel 
approach to the assessment of everyday cognitive failures. These "reasons" were broken into 
four categories based on a priori hypotheses of how they would be related to cognitive 
processes. Missed activities due to overload consisted of more "reasons" than any other 
category. Missed activities due to overload reflected both external demands (e.g., something 
more important came up) as well as poor planning on the part of the participant (e.g., out of 
time) which lead to more opportunities for failures outside the lab. This is likely one reason 
why missed activities due to overload were the most frequently reported. A post hoc 
examination of the between-person relationships of failures reported for the different 
"reasons" revealed that while some of these classifications were related to one another as 
anticipated (i.e., frequencies were significantly correlated within category) other relationships 
were apparent (Table 24). For example, reports of failures for "out of time", "interrupted" and 
"something more important came up" were categorized as overload failures and were 
correlated with one another (r's = .13 to .30) but "too difficult" and "avoided it" (also 
included in the category of overload failures) were more strongly related to "couldn't 
concentrate" (r's = .20 to .22). Similarly, while "interrupted" was related to other reasons in 
the overload category, it was also significantly related to failures reported as "started, but 
forgot to finish" (r = .33), a failure categorized as due to prospective memory. These findings 
suggest that the overload failures category may have reflected a more diverse range of 
cognitive failures than originally anticipated.  
 Similarly, for memory failures not all a priori categorizations of failures were 
reflected in the correlations. For example, failure to complete an errand was categorized as a 
prospective memory failure however inspection of the correlations suggested that a failure 
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for an errand was more strongly related to items classified as retrospective memory failures 
(information: r = .25, date: r = .34, and directions: r = .24; Table 25) than other items 
classified as prospective memory (r's = -.02 to .08). As indicated earlier, there is a 
retrospective memory component to every prospective memory task and these failures likely 
represent some combination of these failures. Similarly supplying participants with more 
forgotten items would allow a better differentiation of categories of failures as well as more 
reports of failures in general. While the a priori categories in the current study have 
theoretical merit, future research should refine the categories of failures.  
 Another limitation was the inability of the current assessment to directly measure 
failures due to poor attention and concentration. Only 11 attention failures were reported 
using the current categorization scheme. It is likely that some attentional failures were 
captured as part of some other cognitive failure. For example, not focusing attention while 
someone is being introduced might make it difficult or impossible to recall their name at a 
later point in time. That is, the failure of attention affects the encoding process but is reported 
as a retrospective memory failure at a later date. Similarly, attentional processes are 
hypothesized to be responsible for noticing environmental cues that indicate it is time for the 
individual to complete a prospective memory task (McDaniel & Einstein, 2007; Smith & 
Bayen, 2006). A failure of attention could impair the individual's ability to notice the 
environmental cue leading to a prospective memory failure. Although the attentional failure 
actually preceded and likely caused the prospective memory failure, the individual may  
report on the outcome of the process, in this case, the prospective memory failure. This is 
likely one reason why attention failures were underreported as part of the categories of 
cognitive failures.  
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 In the current study, these items were supplemented by a Likert-style questionnaire 
specifically tapping a participant’s perception of their ability to attend and focus their 
thoughts that day. It may be that asking individuals to report on a single instance of an 
attentional failure is difficult because the attentional failure, by its very nature, is unlikely to 
be noticed. A thought sampling paradigm would circumvent this burden to some extent (e.g., 
Kane et al., 2007), however, thought sampling may also create reactivity as participants 
monitor thoughts more than they typically would due to the frequency of reporting. The 
Likert scale in the current study attempts to capture participants' perceptions of the frequency 
of these failures during the previous day without significantly impacting participant's daily 
experiences with cognitive interference. 
Reliability and validity of the cognitive interference questionnaire 
 The cognitive interference questionnaire in the current study provided a quantitative 
assessment of attention and concentration throughout the day. The quantitative nature of this 
scale allowed a psychometric analysis of its properties to establish that it was appropriate for 
a daily diary study. As is typical in the development of a scale, I first investigated the 
reliability of the scale for assessing between person differences as well as within-person 
variability in cognitive interference. Just as researchers would not use a scale for assessing 
between-person differences without first assessing the reliability of the scale, development of 
a scale for the assessment of within-person variability should include an examination of the 
psychometric properties of the scale at this level. Instead, daily diary studies use measures 
that have known psychometric properties for between-person comparisons and assume this 
information is relevant for their use in within-person analyses. There are very few examples 
of reliability analyses that address the utility of measures for capturing within-person 
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processes in daily diary studies (e.g., Cranford et al., 2006). Analyses in the current study 
suggested that the extended cognitive interference scale adequately assessed reliable 
variability both between and within individuals. Establishing this property indicates that the 
scale would be appropriate for assessing fluctuations in an individual's ability to focus their 
attention over brief intervals (i.e., days) and allow the identification the day level factors 
associated with these fluctuations (e.g., daily stress; e.g., Sliwinski, Smyth, Hofer & Stawski, 
2006; Stawski et al., 2006).  
Testing the ergodicity assumption in the cognitive interference questionnaire 
 The second set of psychometric analyses the factor structure at each level of analysis. 
Daily diary research tends to implicitly make the ergodicity assumption; that the factor 
structure of a set of indicators observed at the between-person level also describes the 
structure that would be observed within persons (Borsboom, Mellenbergh, & van Heerden, 
2003; Molenaar, 2008). However this assumption needs to be explicitly tested before 
drawing conclusions regarding within-person processes (Hofer & Piccinin, 2010). In the 
current study, I found that the ergodic assumption did not hold; the factor structure at the 
within-person level was different from that at the between-person level. At the between-
person level a one factor structure best fit the data, however at the within-person level a two 
factor structure best fit the data. The within-person factor structure reflects the different 
facets of cognitive interference identified in the introduction: experience of intrusive 
thoughts and suppression of those thoughts. This is similar to the factor structure proposed 
(though not always found) for standard trait measures of cognitive interference. For example, 
the Impact of Events Scale and White Bear Suppression Inventory were specifically designed 
and have been shown to assess two factors: intrusions and attempts at suppression (Creamer, 
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Bell, & Failla, 2003; Hoping & de Jong, 2003). It would appear that at the momentary level 
these two processes are more easily differentiated than when measured at the trait level. It is 
possible that within-persons these processes function somewhat independently of one 
another. That is, a person may experience intrusions without actively attempting to avoid or 
suppress them. It is also possible to have an intrusive thought that is not actively suppressed. 
On the other hand, it is also possible to have just a few intrusive thoughts and to attempt to 
control each and every one. In the first instance, the experience and control would be less 
tightly coupled than in the second case. The daily measure of cognitive interference is able to 
pick up on these day-to-day differences in the coupling of these processes. However, 
individuals who, on average, experience higher levels of intrusive thoughts have more 
opportunities to attempt to avoidance and suppress these thoughts than individuals who 
experience fewer intrusive thoughts. This would indicate that averaging over time makes it 
difficult, if not impossible, to separate the processes. 
Separation of cognitive interference and negative affect 
 Due to the strong relationship between cognitive interference and constructs like 
rumination I also tested whether negative affect and cognitive interference were separable 
constructs at both the between and within person levels. Previous work has shown that these 
constructs are strongly correlated between individuals (r's > .45; Erksine, Kvavilashvili, & 
Kornbot, 2007; Rude, Maestas, & Neff, 2007) as well as within (Moberly & Watkins, 2008). 
Models in the current study examined whether the extended cognitive interference scale 
tapped a construct that was separable from negative affect (which is closely related to 
depressive rumination; Moberly & Watkins, 2008). There was evidence of discriminant 
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validity of the cognitive interference scale and negative affect at both the between and within 
person levels.  
 Providing evidence of the dissociation of cognitive interference processes (i.e., 
intrusions v. control) at the within-person were the correlations between the cognitive 
interference factors and negative affect. Similar to the findings of Courvoisier et al. (2009), I 
found that the intrusions factor was generally more strongly correlated with negative affect 
than the suppression factor. These results imply that the extended cognitive interference 
measure is able to distinguish these two processes at the within-person level. This is 
particularly useful as these processes may be influenced by different day-level processes. 
Being able to differentiate between two distinct processes will provide a better understanding 
of within-person relationships of cognitive interference with other related constructs (e.g., 
rumination, perseverative thinking, stress, negative affect). 
 These analyses provide strong evidence for the use of this measure in daily diary 
studies on intraindividual variability in attentional failures but also serve as a caution for 
researchers interested in daily diary research. Measures developed to tap a construct at the 
between-person level may not exhibit the same psychometric characteristics when attempting 
to assess day-to-day variability.  
Linking self-report and lab-based cognitive measures 
There was only weak evidence of a relationship between self-reported cognitive 
failures and cognitive performance in the lab. The lack of a strong relationship between daily 
self-reported failures and cognitive performance in the lab was disappointing but not 
unexpected. Previous research relating self-reports and lab-based cognitive tasks has often 
found small correlations except where the lab-based tasks directly mirror the cognitive 
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demand outside the lab (Liu & Park, 2004; Hertzog et al., 2000). Episodic memory ability 
was significantly related to reports of somatic failures, retrospective memory failures, and 
cognitive interference scores. This suggests that the episodic memory tasks tapped a more 
general set of cognitive processes that are employed outside as well as inside the lab to 
complete memory tasks. On the other hand, the working memory tasks, which had been 
predicted to be related to cognitive interference but were not, may have focused too tightly 
on specific processes that are not recruited as often outside the lab as they are in the lab.  
Weak relationships between self-reported and lab-based cognition 
Three potential reasons for the weak relationships between self-reports of cognitive 
failures and cognitive performance are discussed next. First, the in-lab cognitive assessments 
may have been too narrow compared with the processes tapped by the self-reported cognitive 
failures. Second, cognitive failures in normal functioning individuals may be more related to 
environmental demands than cognitive ability. Third, the sample in the current study was 
highly selective, possibly restricting the range of ability assessed in the lab. 
The first possible reason for the weak relationship found in the current study is that 
the tasks selected for the in-lab assessment tapped cognitive processes that were not key to 
the cognitive failures outside the lab. To meet cognitive demands outside the lab a variety of 
different cognitive processes are likely recruited by the individual concurrently to complete 
the cognitive task (Cohen & Conway, 2008). In the lab however tasks are designed to isolate 
and tap only one of these processes at a time. For example, the working memory tasks in the 
current study were designed to specifically assess updating and manipulation processes. It 
may be that when cognitive processes are recruited outside the lab to meet a cognitive 
demand, the specific processes assessed in the lab are only recruited to a small extent and 
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others (e.g., resistance to distraction, planning) are recruited to a greater extent. This would 
account for the small though significant relationships found between failures and specific 
cognitive processes. These failures are due to some extent on the measured cognitive process 
but also depend on other processes (e.g., task switching, mental updating).  
A second potential reason for these weak relationships is that, within the normal 
range of functioning, cognitive failures outside the lab may have more to do with 
environmental factors than with actual ability. Typical everyday cognitive demands may not 
tax individuals to the limit of their abilities. Because of this external factors (e.g., stress, 
somatic complaints or being interrupted) that disrupt functioning have a greater impact on an 
individual's ability to meet daily cognitive demands. Researchers have found that daily 
processes such as the experience of a daily stressor are significantly related to poorer 
performance on cognitive tasks both in the lab (Sliwinski, et al., 2006) as well as more 
memory failures outside the lab (Neupert et al., 2006). It may be only when daily cognitive 
demands push individuals to the limits of their ability or they experience significant 
impairment in their ability (e.g., head trauma or MCI) that it plays a role in whether these 
demands are met. This may be one reason why memory complaints are related to actual 
cortical damage in older adults (Striepens et al., 2010; van der Flier et al., 2004). For 
individuals within the normal levels of cognitive ability the number of cognitive failures 
made is better predicted by external events (e.g., stressors, physical symptoms) rather than 
their cognitive ability.  
A third potential reason for the weak relationships in the current study, particularly 
between working memory and cognitive interference, is the selectivity of the sample in the 
current study. The current study included a pre-study component that required participants to 
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complete all of surveys correctly (i.e., on time, remembering to complete morning or evening 
survey) on their own. Individuals with lower cognitive ability either forgot to complete the 
surveys and were excluded from the longer study or may have chosen to not to continue their 
participation due to the high demands. This could have restricted the range of cognitive 
ability sampled in the current study with an under-sampling of individuals at the low end of 
the ability scale. Although the distributions for each of the cognitive tasks appeared 
approximately normal the mean of the distributions may have been shifted to the right 
implying poor representation of the left side of the distribution (i.e., low cognitive ability). 
Construct validity of the cognitive interference scale 
Though the relationship between cognitive interference and cognitive performance 
was weak, there was some evidence of construct validity for the cognitive interference scale 
as it was related to more traditional paper-based measures of trait cognitive interference. All 
of the validated measures were related to scores on the daily cognitive interference scale with 
higher trait levels of cognitive interference predicting higher daily reports of cognitive 
interference. This indicates that reports completed outside the lab over a shortened time 
period are tapping the same construct as the trait measures in the lab. Although the lack of 
relationship with cognitive performance is problematic, the daily measure of cognitive 
interference does appear to capture the same construct as the trait measures of cognitive 
interference. 
Limitations of the current study and suggestions for future research 
There are several limitations in the current study. One major limitation in the current 
study was the lack of a baseline for individuals' daily activities. Without knowing more about 
a given participant's routine it is impossible to tell how many opportunities they had to 
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experience a missed activity. A participant with no activities planned that day has no chance 
to miss those activities whether for cognitive reasons or otherwise. Individuals with different 
social roles will experience different environmental demands during their daily routine. For 
example, someone employed as a caregiver will have a different schedule and must meet 
different demands compared with a stockbroker. Future research should include measures of 
daily activities and routines to determine an individual's level of busyness on any given day. 
Optimally, this would be part of a morning assessment as busyness likely varies daily but 
could also be included as a global measure of environmental demands (e.g., Martin & Park, 
2003). Another potential method would be to specifically recruit individuals with similar 
social roles (e.g., nurses, caregivers, or teachers).  
Another recommendation for future research is to include more focused questions 
about activities missed due to problems with attention and concentration. One possibility 
would be to include a question about consequences related to intrusive thoughts that day 
(e.g., To what extent did these thoughts prevent you from getting things done?). Additionally, 
some cognitive tasks that one might deal with in daily life were not included in the measure. 
Activities like mental math (e.g., tip calculation), reading, and writing were not specifically 
mentioned in the questions and might be more susceptible to cognitive failures. Although 
these activities were likely reported as part of another category (e.g., reading a book as a 
recreational activity or an "other" activity) they may have gone underreported by not being 
specifically included. Similarly with the memory failures question, prospective memory 
failures that include arriving in a location without remembering why you were there might be 
a common failure that was not reported because the option was not presented. These failures 
might have been reported as "other" in that item but also may not have been reported at all. 
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Adding some of these activities and memory failures would likely increase the number of 
failures reported as well as improve the relationships between this measure and cognitive 
performance in the lab. For example, mental math (e.g., tip calculation) often requires 
maintenance and updating of information in working memory and might be more related to 
the working memory tasks in the current study compared with some of the failures currently 
assessed. 
A third suggestion for future studies would be to include a cue to remind participants 
to complete the evening questionnaire. Although compliance was high in the current study (> 
80%), participants more likely to report prospective memory failures were also more likely to 
forget to do the evening survey. Including a beep at the approximate time when the 
participant is supposed to do a survey would likely help participants remember to do the 
survey. Similarly, asking participants to complete the survey earlier in the evening might 
improve recall of failures during the major portion of the day. Participants were asked to 
complete the survey when they went to bed each night. A little over 20% of the surveys were 
completed after midnight which might have been too far removed from some of the events 
for the participant to recall them. Asking participants to complete the survey earlier in the 
evening might improve recall for events that occurred earlier in the day. 
Finally, the current study focused on just one attribute of the cognitive failures: 
whether the missed activity was part of the participant's regular routine or not. It's possible 
that other characteristics of failures are more important for relating them to cognitive 
performance and impact on daily functioning. A failure for an activity or information that are 
high in personal relevance or would have led to significant personal gain might be 
differentially related to cognitive performance. Collecting information on these attributes of 
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the failures would allow failures to be broken down based on these factors to provide a more 
specific definition of the failures and this might change the relationship between failures and 
cognitive performance. 
Synopsis of key findings 
 ,Assessing daily cognitive failures presents a unique challenge for researchers 
interested in understanding how cognitive demands are met (or not) outside the lab. The 
current study examined a novel approach to assessing these failures and provided data 
suggesting this measure was able to provide insight on daily cognitive failures and their 
impact on the individual. Three important findings emerged from the analysis of the daily 
diary data in the current study.  
 First, allowing participants to distinguish between the occurrence of an event and the 
impact that event has on their daily functioning may have encouraged more accurate 
reporting of missed activities and memory failures than in previous research. Particularly 
with older adults, providing participants the opportunity to indicate the extent to which their 
functioning was compromised by particular memory failures and missed activities may have 
increased their comfort with indicating that these events occur in their daily lives.  
 A second important finding is that the processes hypothesized to be involved in 
cognitive interference (i.e., intrusions and avoidance) can be differentiated with intensive 
daily assessments of intrusive thinking without introducing significant reactivity to this 
assessment. These processes have been proposed but are difficult to separate at the between-
person level. However analyses in the current study demonstrated that within-persons over 
days two distinct, measurable processes exist. In-depth examination of these processes at this 
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level may begin to provide researchers with more information about an individual's daily 
cognitive experience.  
 Finally, daily self-reports of memory failures and missed activities remain unrelated 
to objective cognitive performance. This begins to suggest that, for normal functioning 
individuals, environmental demands may have a greater impact on cognitive functioning 
outside the lab rather than an individual's cognitive ability. There is no relationship between 
self-reported cognitive failures and objective performance because daily cognitive demands 
only require a minimal amount of cognitive ability to complete while in-lab tasks push 
individuals to the limits of their ability. Rather than focusing on the lack of relationship 
between these two assessments of cognition, researchers should examine what environmental 
demands and external factors cause failures outside the lab; cognitive ability may only play a 
small role in what daily cognitive demands an individual is able to meet. 
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Table 1 
Breakdown of participant compliance on the evening survey 
 
 
Number of Evening 
Assessments 
Completed N % Cumulative % 
7 63 48.09 48.09 
6 26 19.85 67.94 
5 18 13.74 81.68 
4 9 6.87 88.55 
3 7 5.34 93.89 
2 6 4.58 98.47 
1 2 1.53 100 
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Table 2 
Breakdown of participant compliance for the beeped surveys 
 
Number of Beeped 
Assessments 
completed N % Cumulative % 
100% 10 7.63 7.63 
90%-99% 46 35.11 42.75 
80%-89% 33 25.19 67.94 
70%-79% 13 9.92 77.86 
60%-69% 11 8.4 86.26 
50%-59% 6 4.58 90.84 
< 50% 12 9.16 100 
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Table 3 
Correlations among personality, age, and cognitive performance with compliance 
 
 
Beeped 
Compliance 
Evening 
Compliance 
Extraversion -0.15 -0.18 
Conscientiousness 0.11 0.09 
Neuroticism -0.03 -0.12 
Openness -0.05 -0.03 
Agreeableness -0.15 0.12 
Thought Occurrence 
Questionnaire -0.26 -0.18 
Thought Control 
Questionnaire  
Worry Subscale -0.11 -0.14 
Thought Control 
Questionnaire  
Punishment Subscale -0.08 -0.21 
White Bear Suppression 
Inventory -0.18 -0.13 
Episodic Memory 
Composite Score 0.04 0.17 
Working Memory 
Composite Score 0.09 0.10 
Fluid Intelligence 
Composite Score 0.19 0.13 
Age 0.18 0.20 
 
*Note: Values in bold indicate p<.05, values in italics indicate p<.07. Due to missing data 
on the questionnaire measures n's vary from 128-131. 
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Table 4 
Correlations among cognitive failure frequencies, impact ratings and neuroticism 
 
   Frequencies*   
 Overload PM RM Attention Somatic 
Neuroticism .03 .26 .17 .10 .20 
      
   Bother Ratings   
 Overload PM RM Attention Somatic 
Neuroticism .27 .28 .28 .33 .00 
      
   
Interference 
Ratings   
 Overload PM RM Attention Somatic 
Neuroticism .29 .28 .12 .34 -.06 
      
   
Consequence 
Ratings   
 Overload PM RM Attention Somatic 
Neuroticism .09 .25 .28 -.69 -.13 
 
Note. Due to missing data sample sizes differ for the impact rating correlations (n = 8 - 
84). * Frequency correlations used frequency of failures adjusted for number of days the 
evening survey was correctly completed to control for reporting biases. Frequency 
correlations were calculated using Spearman correlations. 
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Table 5 
Frequency of failures reported by category and reason 
 
 
Meet/Talk 
with someone 
Recreational 
Activity 
Physical 
Activity 
School 
Activity 
Work 
Activity 
Self-Care 
Activity 
Household 
Activity Other Total 
% of all 
Failures 
Out of time 15 21 7 4 17 4 29 19 116 18.50 
Interrupted 1 5 7 4 7 3 10 8 45 7.18 
Forgot to start 2 3 3 0 1 2 3 3 17 2.71 
Couldn't 
Concentrate 0 1 0 2 2 0 6 0 11 1.75 
Something 
more important 3 14 12 0 3 5 24 10 71 11.32 
Started but, 
forgot to finish 1 0 0 0 0 1 8 3 13 2.07 
Avoided it 7 2 7 1 6 5 30 8 66 10.53 
Too difficult 5 1 4 2 4 2 6 3 27 4.31 
Tired 5 9 5 2 7 6 23 2 59 9.41 
Ill 14 9 25 0 2 7 29 13 99 15.79 
Other 20 12 19 5 8 11 7 21 103 16.43 
Total 73 77 89 20 57 46 175 90   
% of all 
Failures 11.64 12.28 14.19 3.19 9.09 7.34 27.91 14.35   
         
Overall 
Total  
         627  
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Table 6 
Frequency and impact ratings for each category of missed activities 
 
  Bother Ratings Interference Ratings Consequence Ratings 
 
 Frequency 
Mean-A 
(SD) 
Mean-M 
(SD) 
Mean-A 
(SD) 
Mean-M 
(SD) 
Mean-A 
(SD) 
Mean-M 
(SD) 
Overload Failures 325 3.11 (1.61) 
2.97 
(1.54) 
2.59 
(1.50) 
2.47 
(1.41) 
2.69 
(1.65) 
2.55 
(1.55) 
Out of time 116 2.77 (1.56) 
2.71 
(1.55) 
2.27 
(1.44) 
2.24 
(1.44) 
2.37 
(1.53) 
2.33 
(1.49) 
Interrupted 45 2.93 (1.59) 
2.88 
(1.52) 
2.75 
(1.46) 
2.66 
(1.42) 
2.38 
(1.63) 
2.31 
(1.61) 
Something more 
important 71 
2.62 
(1.51) 
2.61 
(1.50) 
2.42 
(1.45) 
2.41 
(1.45) 
2.38 
(1.63) 
2.37 
(1.63) 
Avoided it 66 3.30 (1.51) 
3.26 
(1.47) 
2.39 
(1.32) 
2.34 
(1.31) 
2.93 
(1.49) 
2.89 
(1.45) 
Too difficult 27 4.08 (1.61) 
4.06 
(1.57) 
3.68 
(1.44) 
3.64 
(1.39) 
3.20 
(1.89) 
3.16 
(1.84) 
Prospective Memory 
Failures 30 
3.03 
(1.53) 
3.04 
(1.53) 
2.37 
(1.57) 
2.35 
(1.55) 
3.00 
(1.92) 
2.98 
(1.89) 
Forgot to start 17 3.31 (1.70) 
3.31 
(1.70) 
2.00 
(1.46) 
2.00 
(1.46) 
2.69 
(1.96) 
2.66 
(1.90) 
Started but, forgot 
to finish 13 
2.64 
(1.21) 
2.64 
(1.21) 
2.91 
(1.64) 
2.85 
(1.61) 
3.45 
(1.86) 
3.45 
(1.86) 
Attention Failures 11 3.64 (1.29) 
3.64 
(1.29) 
2.45 
(1.21) 
2.45 
(1.21) 
3.09 
(1.45) 
3.09 
(1.45) 
Couldn't 
Concentrate 11 
3.64 
(1.29) 
3.64 
(1.29) 
2.45 
(1.21) 
2.45 
(1.21) 
3.09 
(1.45) 
3.09 
(1.45) 
Somatic Failures 158 3.67 (1.64) 
3.50 
(1.53) 
3.27 
(1.51) 
3.05 
(1.37) 
2.65 
(1.55) 
2.48 
(1.42) 
Tired 59 3.35 (1.57) 
3.29 
(1.53) 
2.94 
(1.50) 
2.85 
(1.39) 
2.51 
(1.45) 
2.43 
(1.35) 
Ill 99 3.84 (1.64) 
3.68 
(1.55) 
3.44 
(1.48) 
3.23 
(1.41) 
2.69 
(1.59) 
2.49 
(1.52) 
Other 103 3.71 (1.99) 
3.70 
(2.00) 
2.96 
(1.97) 
2.94 
(1.95) 
3.31 
(2.21) 
3.28 
(2.19) 
 
Note. Mean-A = Mean using average of ratings on days when participants reported more than 
1 failure in the same category, Mean-M = Mean using maximum of ratings on days when 
participants reported more than 1 failure in the same category. Overall category appears in 
italics. 
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Table 7 
Frequency and impact of memory failures by category and item type 
 
 
  Bother Interference Consequences 
 
Frequency % of all failures 
Mean-A 
(SD) 
Mean-M 
(SD) * 
Mean-A 
(SD) 
Mean-M 
(SD) * 
Mean-A 
(SD) 
Mean-M 
(SD) * 
Retrospective 
Memory Failures 157 43.85 
3.27 
(1.88) 
3.18 
(1.86) 
2.55 
(1.68) 
2.51 
(1.68) 
2.30 
(1.75) 
2.24 
(1.70) 
Put 82 22.91 3.15 (1.85) -- 
2.56 
(1.63) -- 
2.10 
(1.58) -- 
Date 11 3.07 3.91 (1.76) -- 
2.82 
(1.66) -- 
3.09 
(1.92) -- 
Directions 10 2.79 3.10 (1.60) -- 
2.90 
(1.60) -- 
2.30 
(1.57) -- 
Name 54 15.08 2.26 (1.25) -- 
1.59 
(0.96) -- 
1.44 
(0.74) -- 
Information 22 6.15 4.64 (2.17) -- 
3.91 
(2.09) -- 
4.09 
(2.27) -- 
Prospective 
Memory Failures 130 36.31 
3.58 
(1.83) 
3.54 
(1.82) 
2.72 
(1.76) 
2.69 
(1.75) 
3.24 
(1.83) 
3.19 
(1.80) 
Appointment 13 3.63 4.31 (1.49) -- 
2.54 
(1.66) -- 
3.31 
(1.70) -- 
Errand 30 8.38 3.20 (1.52) -- 
2.37 
(1.45) -- 
2.77 
(1.33) -- 
Medication 55 15.36 3.81 (1.98) -- 
2.89 
(1.91) -- 
3.44 
(1.99) -- 
Chore 32 8.94 3.03 (1.77) -- 
2.69 
(1.71) -- 
3.09 
(1.91) -- 
Unclassified 
Memory Failures 
(Other) 
49 13.69 2.34 (1.74) -- 
2.31 
(1.77) -- 
2.35 
(1.64) -- 
Total number of 
memory failures 358        
 
Note. Mean-A = Mean using average of ratings on days when participants reported more than 
1 failure in the same category, Mean-M = Mean using maximum of ratings on days when 
participants reported more than 1 failure in the same category. Overall category appears in 
italics. *Participants reported only one failure for forgotten item type and a second mean 
using maximum ratings was not required. 
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Table 8 
Frequency and impact of failures broken down by typicality 
 
  Bother Interference Consequences 
Retrospective 
Memory Failures Frequency 
Mean-A 
(SD) 
Mean-M 
(SD) 
Mean-A 
(SD) 
Mean-M 
(SD) 
Mean-A 
(SD) 
Mean-M 
(SD) 
Recently 
learned 37 
3.00 
(1.89) 
2.97 
(1.90) 
2.97 
(1.82) 
2.94 
(1.83) 
2.51 
(1.72) 
2.50 
(1.70) 
Well-known 60 3.09 (1.87) 
3.06 
(1.84) 
1.98 
(1.48) 
1.98 
(1.48) 
2.16 
(1.84) 
2.11 
(1.74) 
        
  Bother  Interference Consequences 
Prospective 
Memory Failures Frequency 
Mean-A 
(SD) 
Mean-M 
(SD) 
Mean-A 
(SD) 
Mean-M 
(SD) 
Mean-A 
(SD) 
Mean-M 
(SD) 
Routine 93 3.71 (1.93) 
3.64 
(1.90) 
2.95 
(1.89) 
2.90 
(1.86) 
3.47 
(1.95) 
3.37 
(1.92) 
Not routine 67 3.31 (1.58) 
3.27 
(1.58) 
2.27 
(1.38) 
2.23 
(1.36) 
2.87 
(1.60) 
2.86 
(1.59) 
        
  Bother Interference Consequences 
Overload 
Failures Frequency 
Mean-A 
(SD) 
Mean-M 
(SD) 
Mean-A 
(SD) 
Mean-M 
(SD) 
Mean-A 
(SD) 
Mean-M 
(SD) 
Routine 128 3.19 (1.53) 
3.08 
(1.46) 
3.03 
(1.59) 
2.91 
(1.55) 
2.77 
(1.67) 
2.68 
(1.59) 
Not routine 197 2.99 (1.64) 
2.88 
(1.58) 
2.27 
(1.33) 
2.20 
(1.29) 
2.52 
(1.60) 
2.41 
(1.50) 
        
  Bother Interference Consequences 
Somatic Failures Frequency 
Mean-A 
(SD) 
Mean-M 
(SD) 
Mean-A 
(SD) 
Mean-M 
(SD) 
Mean-A 
(SD) 
Mean-M 
(SD) 
Routine 97 3.90 (1.59) 
3.71 
(1.48) 
3.39 
(1.48) 
3.23 
(1.35) 
2.66 
(1.62) 
2.54 
(1.48) 
Not routine 62 3.17 (1.62) 
3.13 
(1.62) 
2.85 
(1.49) 
2.80 
(1.49) 
2.33 
(1.40) 
2.31 
(1.38) 
 
Note. Mean-A = Mean using average of ratings on days when participants reported more than 
1 failure in the same category, Mean-M = Mean using maximum of ratings on days when 
participants reported more than 1 failure in the same category. Overall category appears in 
italics.  
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Table 9 
Estimated ratings of impact by age 
 
 Bother Interference Consequences 
 Young Old Young Old Young Old 
 M (SE) M (SE) M (SE) M (SE) M (SE) M (SE) 
Overload Failures 2.78 (0.47) 
1.88 
(0.42) 
2.61 
(0.47) 
2.05 
(0.41) 
2.44 
(0.46) 
1.92 
(0.41) 
Prospective 
Memory Failures 
2.99 
(0.51) 
2.01 
(0.44) 
2.66 
(0.50) 
1.69 
(0.43) 
2.78 
(0.50) 
2.16 
(0.44) 
Retrospective 
Memory Failures 
2.96 
(0.54) 
2.09 
(0.43) 
2.47 
(0.52) 
1.63 
(0.42) 
2.10 
(0.54) 
1.33 
(0.42) 
Somatic Failures 3.03 (0.52) 
2.13 
(0.48) 
2.81 
(0.50) 
2.30 
(0.46) 
2.46 
(0.51) 
1.56 
(0.47) 
 
Note. Model estimated means for each category of failures. Young = 1 SD below the mean in 
age (~30 years old), Old = 1 SD above the mean in age (~65 years old) 
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Table 10 
Model based estimates of impact by failure typicality and age 
 
 Bother Interference Consequences 
 Young Old Young Old Young Old 
Retrospective 
Memory Failures M (SE) M (SE) M (SE) M (SE) M (SE) M (SE) 
Recently Learned 2.88
a
 
(1.20) 
1.50a 
(0.97) 
3.12h 
(0.92) 
2.04h,j 
(0.75) 
2.68k 
(0.98) 
1.51k 
(0.79) 
Well-known 2.96
b
 
(1.24) 
1.92b 
(0.92) 
2.18i 
(0.95) 
1.07i,j 
(0.71) 
2.12l 
(1.01) 
1.35l 
(0.75) 
       
 Bother Interference Consequences 
 Young Old Young Old Young Old 
Prospective 
Memory Failures M (SE) M (SE) M (SE) M (SE) M (SE) M (SE) 
Routine 2.05 (0.78) 
1.85 
(0.70) 
1.85 
(0.75) 
0.98 
(0.67) 
1.78 
(0.77) 
1.50 
(0.69) 
Not routine 2.57 (0.83) 
1.40 
(0.69) 
0.95 
(0.79) 
0.83 
(0.66) 
1.87 
(0.81) 
1.28 
(0.68) 
       
 Bother Interference Consequences 
 Young Old Young Old Young Old 
Overload Failures M (SE) M (SE) M (SE) M (SE) M (SE) M (SE) 
Routine 2.15
c
 
(0.60) 
1.46c 
(0.54) 
2.03 
(0.57) 
1.71 
(0.52) 
2.35 
(0.62) 
2.26 
(0.56) 
Not routine 2.16
d
 
(0.57) 
1.38d 
(0.50) 
1.50 
(0.54) 
1.17 
(0.48) 
2.57 
(0.58) 
1.82 
(0.52) 
       
 Bother Interference Consequences 
 Young Old Young Old Young Old 
Somatic Failures M (SE) M (SE) M (SE) M (SE) M (SE) M (SE) 
Routine 4.01
e
 
(0.78) 
3.39e,g 
(0.76) 
3.63 
(0.70) 
2.97 
(0.70) 
3.56m 
(0.71) 
2.56m,o 
(0.71) 
Not routine 3.92
f
 
(0.80) 
2.73f,g 
(0.72) 
3.33 
(0.73) 
2.77 
(0.63) 
3.12n 
(0.75) 
2.34n,o 
(0.65) 
 
Note. Model estimated means for each category of failures. Young = 1 SD below the mean in 
age (~30 years old), Old = 1 SD above the mean in age (~65 years old). Means with the same 
subscript are significantly different from one another.
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Table 11 
Intraclass correlations for cognitive interference items and total score 
 
Item ICC 
1. Think about personal worries? 0.65 
2. Think about something you didn’t mean 
to think about? 
0.64 
3. Have trouble concentrating? 0.63 
4. Have thoughts that kept jumping into your 
head? 
0.63 
5. Try to avoid certain thoughts? 0.62 
6. I have thoughts that you could not stop? 0.64 
7. Try to put problems out of your mind? 0.61 
8. Do things to distract yourself from your 
thoughts? 
0.66 
9. Stay busy just to keep thoughts from 
entering your mind? 
0.68 
  
Total score 0.77 
 
Note. ICC = Intraclass Correlation
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Table 12 
Generalizability theory variance decomposition models 
 
Source Fixed % Random % 
Person 1.11 51.41 1.11 51.41 
Day 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.08 
Item 0.06 2.57 0.06 2.57 
Person*Day 0.30 14.15 0.30 14.16 
Person*Item 0.20 9.21 0.20 9.20 
Day*Item 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.08 
Error 0.49 22.53 0.48 22.51 
Total 2.15  2.15  
 
Note. The fixed column refers to constraining factors in the G-theory model to be fixed. The 
random column refers to allowing factors in the G-theory model to be random. 
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Table 13 
Factor loadings and eigenvalues for multilevel exploratory factor analysis 
 
Item 
Between 
Factor 
Within 
Factor 1 
Within 
Factor 2 
1. Think about personal worries? 0.865 0.574 0.378 
2. Think about something you 
didn’t mean to think about? 0.938 0.712 0.370 
3. Have trouble concentrating? 0.815 0.580 0.264 
4. Have thoughts that kept jumping 
into your head? 0.951 0.752 0.423 
5. Try to avoid certain thoughts? 0.976 0.596 0.592 
6. I have thoughts that you could 
not stop? 0.972 0.624 0.480 
7. Try to put problems out of your 
mind? 0.978 0.427 0.674 
8. Do things to distract yourself 
from your thoughts? 0.963 0.441 0.798 
9. Stay busy just to keep thoughts 
from entering your mind? 0.924 0.354 0.706 
Eigenvalue for factor 7.845 4.016 1.166 
 
Note. Loading for items that were later constrained to be on that factor are in bold. Item 5, 
which loads highly on both within-person factors, is in italics.  
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Table 14 
Model fits for multilevel confirmatory factor analysis models examining cognitive interference and negative affect 
 
 Evening NA Beep 1 NA Beep 2 NA Beep 3 NA Beep 4 NA Beep 5 NA 
 
1 Factor 
Model 
2 Factor 
Model 
1 Factor 
Model 
2 Factor 
Model 
1 Factor 
Model* 
2 Factor 
Model 
1 Factor 
Model 
2 Factor 
Model* 
1 Factor 
Model 
2 Factor 
Model 
1 Factor 
Model 
2 Factor 
Model* 
Model Fits             
Chi- 
square 1212.5 334.2 1647.3 297.3 1767.9 329.1 1526.1 305.9 4063.0 357.4 1803.1 325.5 
df 130 126 130 126 131 126 130 127 130 126 131 127 
p-value <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 <.001 
TLI 0.60 0.92 0.38 0.93 0.35 0.92 0.39 0.93 -0.65 0.91 0.35 0.93 
RMSEA 0.10 0.05 0.12 0.04 0.12 0.04 0.11 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.12 0.04 
             
Correlations              
Between             
NA and 
CI -- .69 -- .68 -- .65 -- .74 -- .61 -- .75 
Within             
NA and 
Intrusions -- .54 -- .22 -- .23 -- .28 -- .39 -- .23 
NA and 
Control -- .39 -- .12 -- .23 -- .30 -- .21 -- .20 
Intrusions 
and 
Control -- .68 -- .69 -- .69 -- .69 -- .69 -- .69 
 
Note. Correlations cannot be computed for 1 factor models. *These models required an additional constraint for model estimation. The 
negative affect item 3 (upset) had a negative residual that was constrained to be a small value (.001). CI = cognitive interference, NA = 
negative affect, RMSEA = Root Mean Square Error of Approximation, TLI = Tucker Lewis Fit Index.
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Table 15 
Correlations among cognitive tasks 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Backward 
Letter Span --        
2. Subtract 2 
Span .48        
3. Letter-
Number 
Sequencing 
.44 .44       
4. Card 
Location 
Memory 
-.03 -.12 -.02      
5. AVLT List 
Memory .08 .11 .18 .26     
6. Paired 
Associates .16 .10 .29 .39 .41    
7. Ravens .35 .36 .46 .13 .29 .31   
8. Letter Series .35 .37 .43 .25 .35 .39 .59  
Mean 9.38 15.66 10.33 11.47 8.71 7.59 20.96 12.38 
SD 8.00 11.15 2.20 3.40 2.51 6.22 5.42 5.29 
Skew 1.25 0.94 -0.09 0.34 0.10 1.04 -0.97 -0.07 
Kurtosis 1.23 1.15 0.81 0.23 -0.27 0.41 0.24 -0.64 
 
Note. Correlations in bold significant at p < .05. Correlations in boxes represent the three 
constructs working memory, episodic memory, and fluid intelligence. 
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Table 16 
Factor analysis results for cognitive tasks 
 
Task Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
1. Backward Letter Span 0.650 0.024 0.100 
2. Subtract 2 Span 0.692 -0.048 0.125 
3. Letter-Number Sequencing 0.643 0.159 0.186 
4. Card Location Memory -0.172 0.442 0.278 
5. AVLT List Memory 0.097 0.404 0.303 
6. Paired Associates 0.206 0.939 0.053 
7. Ravens 0.475 0.200 0.510 
8. Letter Series 0.418 0.291 0.663 
Eigenvalue 14.676 3.899 1.032 
    
Inter-factor correlations    
 Factor 1 Factor 2  
Factor 2 0.211   
Factor 3 0.453 0.338  
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Table 17 
Correlations among cognitive composite scores and cognitive failures 
 
 
Prospective 
Memory 
Failures 
Retrospective 
Memory 
Failures 
Overload 
Failures 
Somatic 
Failures 
Working Memory 
Composite Scores -.02 .02 .22* -.16† 
     
Episodic Memory 
Composite Scores -.02 -.26* -.07 -.16† 
     
Fluid Intelligence 
Composite Scores -.08 -.16† .04 -.08 
 
Note. *  p < .05, † p< .10. Frequency correlations used frequency of failures adjusted for 
number of days the evening survey was correctly completed to control for reporting 
biases. Frequency correlations were calculated using Spearman correlations. 
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Table 18 
Correlations among cognitive interference and cognitive performance composite scores 
 
 
Cognitive 
Interference Total 
Score 
Intrusions 
Subscale 
Score 
Thought 
Control 
Subscale Score 
Working Memory 
Composite Scores -.11 -.07 -.15† 
    
Episodic Memory 
Composite Scores .18* .19* .15† 
    
Fluid Intelligence 
Composite Scores -.04 .03 -.12 
 
Note. *  p < .05, † p< .10.  
144 
 
Table 19 
Model estimated means of cognitive interference at different levels of cognitive 
performance 
 
 Working Memory Episodic Memory Fluid Intelligence 
 Low Average High Low Average High Low Average High 
 M (SE) M (SE) M (SE) M (SE) M (SE) M (SE) M (SE) M (SE) M (SE) 
Cognitive 
Interference 
Total Score 
21.57 
(0.94) 
21.11 
(0.87) 
20.66 
(0.94) 
20.33 
(0.94) 
21.11 
(0.86) 
21.89 
(0.94) 
21.35 
(1.00) 
21.11 
(0.87) 
20.87 
(1.00) 
   
  
  
  
   
Intrusion 
Subscale Score 
11.97 
(0.52) 
11.82 
(0.48) 
11.67 
(0.52) 
11.36 
(0.51) 
11.82 
(0.47) 
12.28 
(0.51) 
11.73 
(0.55) 
11.82 
(0.48) 
11.91 
(0.55) 
   
  
  
  
   
Control 
Subscale Score 
9.59 
(0.45) 
9.29 
(0.41) 
8.99 
(0.45) 
8.97 
(0.45) 
9.29 
(0.41) 
9.61 
(0.45) 
9.62 
(0.48) 
9.29 
(0.42) 
8.96 
(0.48) 
 
Note. SE = standard estimate, Low = individuals performing at 1 standard deviation 
below the mean, Average = individuals performing at the mean, High = individuals 
performing at 1 standard deviation above the mean. 
145 
 
Table 20 
Cognitive interference differences across age 
 
 Young Old 
 M (SE) M (SE) 
Cognitive 
Interference 
Total Score 
23.79 
(1.17) 
18.53 
(0.84) 
   
Intrusion 
Subscale Score 
13.30 
(0.64) 
10.39 
(0.63) 
   
Control 
Subscale Score 
10.48 
(0.56) 
8.14 
(0.55) 
 
Note. SE = standard estimate, Young = 1 SD below the mean in age (~30 years old), Old 
= 1 SD above the mean in age (~65 years old). 
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Table 21 
Model based estimates of cognitive interference for different levels of episodic memory 
performance across age 
 
 Young Old 
 
Low 
EM 
High 
EM 
Low 
EM 
High 
EM 
 M (SE) M (SE) M (SE) M (SE) 
Cognitive 
Interference 
Total Score 
21.70 
(1.34) 
23.01 
(1.03) 
19.53 
(1.01) 
18.30 
(1.46) 
  
  
  
Intrusion 
Subscale Score 
12.04 
(0.74) 
12.88 
(0.57) 
10.91 
(0.56) 
10.26 
(0.81) 
  
  
  
Control 
Subscale Score 
9.66 
(0.65) 
10.14 
(0.50) 
8.62 
(0.49) 
8.04 
(0.71) 
 
Note. EM = Episodic memory, SE = Standard estimate. 
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Table 22 
Descriptive statistics for trait cognitive interference measures 
 
Measure N Mean SD Min Max 
Thought Occurrence 
Questionnaire 131 29.05 5.64 17 51 
Thought Control 
Questionnaire (Worry 
Subscale) 
131 9.63 3.09 6 24 
Thought Control 
Questionnaire 
(Punishment Subscale) 
130 7.78 2.21 6 16 
White Bear Suppression 
Inventory 130 46.96 12.32 15 70 
Impact of Events Scale 129 34.88 10.33 15 56 
  
Note. Differences in sample size are due to participants refusing to complete certain items 
on the questionnaires.
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Table 23 
Estimates relating trait cognitive interference and daily cognitive interference 
 
 Cognitive Interference Intrusions Control 
 Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE 
Thought Occurrence 
Questionnaire 4.03 0.84 2.08 0.47 1.94 0.41 
Impact of Events 
Scale 2.59 0.80 1.36 0.44 1.22 0.39 
White Bear 
Suppression 
Inventory 
3.93 0.81 1.94 0.46 1.99 0.39 
Thought Control 
Questionnaire - 
Punishment Subscale 
2.79 0.80 1.38 0.45 1.41 0.39 
Thought Control 
Questionnaire - 
Worry Subscale 
2.25 0.89 1.17 0.50 1.08 0.44 
 
Note. All estimates significant at p < .05. 
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Table 24 
Correlations among reasons for missed daily activities 
 
  Overload Failures Prospective Memory 
Attention 
Failures 
Somatic 
Failures 
   
Out of 
Time Interrupted 
Something 
more 
important 
came up 
Avoided 
it 
Too 
difficult 
Forgot 
to start 
Started but 
forgot to 
finish 
Couldn't 
concentrate 
Too 
tired 
Overload 
Failures 
Interrupted .30         
Something 
more important 
came up .27 .13        
Avoided it -.01 .14 .09       
Too difficult .07 -.01 .10 .05      
Prospective 
Memory 
Forgot to start .13 .11 .07 .20 -.02     
Started but 
forgot to finish .14 .33 .10 .03 .05 .25    
Attention 
Failures 
Couldn't 
concentrate -.13 .11 .04 .20 .22 -.10 .03   
Somatic 
Failures 
Too tired .05 .24 .09 .09 .06 -.15 .23 .09  
Ill -.11 .09 .16 -.05 .20 -.03 .02 .04 .22 
 
Note. Bolded correlations are significant, p ≤ .05. 
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Table 25 
Correlations among memory failure items 
 
  
 
 
Retrospective Memory 
 
Prospective Memory 
   
Put 
something Date Directions Name Information Appointment Errand Medication Chore 
Retrospective 
Memory 
Date .02         
Directions .18 .15        
Name .27 .14 .27       
Information .17 .13 .19 .21      
Prospective 
Memory 
Appointment -.05 .06 .04 .21 .16     
Errand .06 .23 .18 .16 .28 .14    
Medication .13 .06 -.02 .02 .04 -.05 .08   
Chore -.07 .04 -.06 .02 -.02 .36 -.03 .17  
 Unclassified .11 -.06 .05 .16 .12 .05 .04 .17 .15 
 
Note. Bolded correlations are significant, p ≤ .05. 
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Figure 1 
Eigenvalues for Multilevel Exploratory Factor Analysis 
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Equations 
Equation 1. Between-person reliability (fixed effects model) 
Equation 2. Within-person reliability (fixed effects model) 
Equation 3. Between-person reliability (random effects model) 
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σ
2
person + [σ2person*item/m] 
σ
2
person + [σ2person*item/m] + σ2time + σ2person*time + [σ2error/m] 
rbp = 
(3) 
σ
2
person*time 
[σ2person*time] + [σ2error/m] 
rwp = (2) 
σ
2
person + [σ2person*item/m] 
σ
2
person + [σ2person*item/m] + [σ2error/m] 
rbp = (1) 
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Appendix F 
Beeped Schedules
5am Profile: This alarm schedule is used for participants who report typically waking up on 
weekdays between 4:00 am and 5:00 am
 
. 
Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday 
6:45 am 6:15 am 7:25 am 5:55 am 7:00 am 6:40 am 7:40 am 
9:05 am 8:50 am 9:30 am 8:25 am 9:10 am 8:55 am 10:10 am 
11:30 am 11:05 am 12:25 pm 10:55 am 12:05 pm 11:10 am 12:35 pm 
2:25 pm 1:50 pm 3:05 pm 1:30 pm 2:55 pm 2:00 pm 3:20 pm 
5:15 pm 4:25 pm 5:45 pm 4:10 pm 5:40 pm 4:35 pm 5:55 pm 
 
 
6am Profile: This alarm schedule is used for participants who report typically waking up on 
weekdays between 5:01 am and 6:00 am
 
. 
Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday 
7:45 am 7:15 am 8:25 am 6:55 am 8:00 am 7:40 am 8:40 am 
10:05 am 9:50 am 10:30 am 9:25 am 10:10 am 9:55 am 11:10 am 
12:30 pm 12:05 pm 1:25 pm 11:55 am 1:05 pm 12:10 pm 1:35 pm 
3:25 pm 2:50 pm 4:05 pm 2:30 pm 3:55 pm 3:00 pm 4:20 pm 
6:15 pm 5:25 pm 6:45 pm 5:10 pm 6:40 pm 5:35 pm 6:55 pm 
 
 
7am Profile: This alarm schedule is used for participants who report typically waking up on 
weekdays between 
 
6:01 am and 7:00 am. 
Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday 
8:45 am 8:15 am 9:25 am 7:55 am 9:00 am 8:40 am 9:40 am 
11:05 am 10:50 am 11:30 am 10:25 am 11:10 am 10:55 am 12:10 pm 
1:30 pm 1:05 pm 2:25 pm 12:55 pm 2:05 pm 1:10 pm 2:35 pm 
4:25 pm 3:50 pm 5:05 pm 3:30 pm 4:55 pm 4:00 pm 5:20 pm 
7:15 pm 6:25 pm 7:45 pm 6:10 pm 7:40 pm 6:35 pm 7:55 pm 
 
 
8am Profile: This alarm schedule is used for participants who report typically waking up on 
weekdays between 7:01 am and 8:00 am
 
. 
Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday 
9:45 am 9:15 am 10:25 am 8:55 am 10:00 am 9:40 am 10:40 am 
12:05 pm 11:50 am 12:30 pm 11:25 am 12:10 pm 11:55 am 1:10 pm 
2:30 pm 2:05 pm 3:25 pm 1:55 pm 3:05 pm 2:10 pm 3:35 pm 
5:25 pm 4:50 pm 6:05 pm 4:30 pm 5:55 pm 5:00 pm 6:20 pm 
8:15 pm 7:25 pm 8:45 pm 7:10 pm 8:40 pm 7:35 pm 8:55 pm 
 
 
9am Profile: This alarm schedule is used for participants who report typically waking up on 
weekdays between 8:01 am and 9:00 am
 
. 
Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday 
10:45 am 10:15 am 11:25 am 9:55 am 11:00 am 10:40 am 11:40 am 
1:05 pm 12:50 pm 1:30 pm 12:25 pm 1:10 pm 12:55 pm 2:10 pm 
3:30 pm 3:05 pm 4:25 pm 2:55 pm 4:05 pm 3:10 pm 4:35 pm 
6:25 pm 5:50 pm 7:05 pm 5:30 pm 6:55 pm 6:00 pm 7:20 pm 
9:15 pm 8:25 pm 9:45 pm 8:10 pm 9:40 pm 8:35 pm 9:55 pm 
 
 
10am Profile: This alarm schedule is used for participants who report typically waking up on 
weekdays between 9:01 am and 10:00 am
 
. 
Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday 
11:45 am 11:15 am 12:25 pm 10:55 am 12:00 pm 11:40 am 12:40 pm 
2:05 pm 1:50 pm 2:30 pm 1:25 pm 2:10 pm 1:55 pm 3:10 pm 
4:30 pm 4:05 pm 5:25 pm 3:55 pm 5:05 pm 4:10 pm 5:35 pm 
7:25 pm 6:50 pm 8:05 pm 6:30 pm 7:55 pm 7:00 pm 8:20 pm 
10:15 pm 9:25 pm 10:45 pm 9:10 pm 10:40 pm 9:35 pm 10:55 pm 
 
 
11am Profile: This alarm schedule is used for participants who report typically waking up on 
weekdays between 10:01 am and 11:00 am
 
. 
Sunday Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday 
12:45 pm 12:15 pm 1:25 pm 11:55 am 1:00 pm 12:40 pm 1:40 pm 
3:05 pm 2:50 pm 3:30 pm 2:25 pm 3:10 pm 2:55 pm 4:10 pm 
5:30 pm 5:05 pm 6:25 pm 4:55 pm 6:05 pm 5:10 pm 6:35 pm 
8:25 pm 7:50 pm 9:05 pm 7:30 pm 8:55 pm 8:00 pm 9:20 pm 
11:15 pm 10:25 pm 11:45 pm 10:10 pm 11:40 pm 10:35 pm 11:55 pm 
 
 
The schedules above must be entered into Palm Desktop so that they can then be downloaded to 
individual palmtop computers. Signals are scheduled by creating “Profiles” in the calendar on 
Palm Desktop.  A profile is used to schedule the beeps because it can be downloaded to many 
different PDAs with different ID numbers. Creating a profile is similar to creating a Palm ID 
number (as you did in Section 2.1), but the specific procedures are slightly different. Below are 
instructions for creating the profiles needed for CHAP: 
 
1. Open Palm Desktop on the computer by clicking on the Palm Desktop icon on the 
computer desktop or by going to Start  All Programs  Palm Desktop. 
2. In the top right corner of the screen, click the drop down menu next to “User” (A 
in Figure 2.1) and select “Edit users…” 
3. Click on the “Profiles” button on the right of the Users screen (see Figure 2.4). A 
window will open that lists all of the profiles you create.  
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Appendix G 
Missed Activities Checklist 
Memory Failures Checklist 
Cognitive Interference Questionnaire 
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Uncompleted Activities: 
 
The next several questions ask about things that you wanted to do today. 
 
Which of these things did you want to accomplish today but were unable to complete? 
(check all that apply) 
Meet/talk with some Self-care task 
Leisure activity Household chores 
Physical activity Other 
School task None of the above 
Work task  
 
For each category selected:  
 
Why did you not [insert name of activity]? 
Ran out of time Something more important came up 
Was interrupted Started, but forgot to finish 
Forgot to start it Decided to avoid it 
Not feeling well It was too difficult 
Couldn’t concentrate Other 
Too tired  
 
Follow-up questions for each activity selected: 
 
Question Response Options 
How much does not [insert name of 
activity] bother you now? 1= not at all, 7=very much 
How much did not doing this interfere with 
your daily routine? 1= not at all, 7=very much 
Do you think not [insert name of activity] 
will have consequences beyond today? 1= not at all, 7=very much 
Is this activity part of your daily routine? 1= not at all, 7=very much 
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Memory Failures: 
 
During the day today, which of the following things did you forget?   
(Mark all that apply) 
Taking medicine Directions 
An errand Appointment 
Household chore Personal date 
Where you put something A name 
Important information Other 
 None of the above 
 
For each category selected:  
 
Question Response Options 
How much does forgetting [insert name of 
task] bother you now?   1= not at all, 7=very much 
How much did forgetting interfere with your 
schedule?   1= not at all, 7=very much 
Do you think forgetting [insert name of task] 
will have consequences beyond today? 1= not at all, 7=very much 
Is [insert name of task] part of your daily 
routine?   
* for medication, errand, appointment, chore 
1= not at all, 7=very much 
Is this [insert name of task] something you:   
* for important information, directions, 
personal date, name, location  
just recently learned, have known for a 
while 
 
 
  235   
 
Strategy Use: 
 
On the next few pages are different things people do to try to remember.  
 
How often did you do each of these things TODAY?  
 
Question Response Options 
TODAY, did you: 
 
Make lists of things you needed to do?   
Write yourself reminder notes? 
Keep an appointment book updated in 
order to remember to do things? 
Plan your daily schedule in advance so you 
would not forget things? 
Have someone else remind you to do 
things? 
Rehearse things in your mind so you would 
not forget to do them? 
yes, no 
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On the next several pages are statements that describe different thoughts that people 
sometimes have. For each one, choose the response that best describes the thoughts you 
had TODAY. 
 
Today, how often did you: 
  
Questions Response Options 
Think about personal worries?  
Think about something you didn’t mean to 
think about? 
Have trouble concentrating? 
Have thoughts that kept jumping into your 
head? 
Try to avoid certain thoughts? 
I have thoughts that you could not stop? 
Try to put problems out of your mind? 
Do things to distract yourself from your 
thoughts? 
Stay busy just to keep thoughts from 
entering your mind? 
1=none, 4=a few times, 7=very often 
 
  237   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix H 
Ecological Momentary Assessment Questions 
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Stress (beeped assessment): 
The next several pages are going to ask questions about stressful events or experiences 
SINCE THE LAST ASSESSMENT. 
 
Did anything stressful occur since the last assessment? (yes/no) 
 
If they report that something stressful has occurred:   
 
Which of the following types of stressors have you experienced since the last 
assessment? 
Argument/disagreement/conflict Health or accident 
Work/school related event Event that happened to others 
Home related event  Other stressor 
 
  
Which specific type(s) of [insert name of stressor category here] did you 
experience?  (select all that apply) 
 
Argument/disagreement/conflict 
General disagreement Value differences 
Work related Family issues 
Financial issues Other  
Miscommunication  
 
Work/education 
Work overload/demand Job security Other 
Mistakes Technical breakdown  
 
Home 
Home overload/demand Home or car repairs Financial concerns 
Pet event Neighborhood concerns Other 
 
Health/accident 
Accident  
Illness 
Visit/contact with 
healthcare provider 
Other  
 
Events that happen to others 
Others’ health or medical problems Social concerns 
Financial problems Other  
 
Other 
Traffic or transportation Weather Other  
News Mistakes  
 
For each category of stressors: 
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How stressful or unpleasant was this 
[insert category name] when it occurred?   1=not at all, 7=extremely 
How stressful or unpleasant is it now?   1=not at all, 7=extremely 
 
Is this [insert category name] resolved? yes, no 
 
How much have you thought about it since 
it happened? 
1=not at all, 7=a great deal 
 
How much have you tried to stop thinking 
about this [insert category name] since it 
happened? 
1=not at all, 7=a great deal 
 
 
  
 
If they report that nothing stressful occurred since last assessment:   
 
On the next page is a list of some experiences. Which of these happened to you 
(even if you did not find them stressful), SINCE THE LAST ASSESSMENT? 
 
Which of these happened to you since the last assessment? (mark all that apply)  
 
Argument, disagreement or conflict Health issue or accident 
Difficulties involving work/school A negative event that happened to others 
Difficulties at home None of the above 
 
For each category selected: 
  
How unpleasant was this [insert category 
name] when it occurred?   1= not at all, 7= extremely 
How unpleasant is it now?   1= not at all, 7= extremely 
Is this [insert category name] resolved? yes, no 
 
If “none of the above” is selected: 
Why do you think nothing stressful happened to you since the last assessment? 
I just got lucky. Another reason 
Stressful things don’t usually happen to 
me. 
 
I avoided stressful situations.  
I handled situations before they became 
stressful. 
 
 
 
 
Anticipating future stress: 
 
  240   
 
Do you think that you will have anything STRESSFUL happen in the next few hours? 
Response Options: yes/no 
If yes:  How unpleasant or stressful do you expect it to be? (1= not at all, 7= 
extremely) 
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Affect (beeped assessment): 
 
On the following pages are descriptions of feelings. Rate how you feel right now.   
Question Response Options 
Which of these best describes how you feel right now? 1=sleepy, 7=active/alert    
Which of these best describes how you feel right now? 1=unpleasant, 7=pleasant  
Which of these best describes how you feel right now? 1=depressed, 7=excited 
Which of these best describes how you feel right now? 1=relaxed, 7= stressed 
 
  
 
Question Response Options 
How happy do you feel right now?   1=not at all happy, 4=moderately, 
7=extremely happy 
How tense do you feel right now? 
 
1=not at all tense, 4=moderately, 
7=extremely tense 
How enthusiastic do you feel right now? 
 
1=not at all enthusiastic, 4=moderately, 
7=extremely enthusiastic 
How sad do you feel right now? 
 
1=not at all sad, 4=moderately, 
7=extremely sad 
How content do you feel right now? 
 
1=not at all content, 4=moderately, 
7=extremely content 
How upset do you feel right now? 
 
1=not at all upset, 4=moderately, 
7=extremely upset 
How excited do you feel right now? 
 
1=not at all excited, 4=moderately, 
7=extremely excited 
How disappointed do you feel right now? 
 
1=not at all disappointed, 4=moderately, 
7=extremely disappointed 
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Affect (waking assessment): 
 
On the following pages are descriptions of feelings. Rate how you feel right now.   
Question Response Options 
Which of these best describes how you think you will 
feel today? 
1=sleepy, 7=active/alert    
Which of these best describes how you think you will 
feel today? 
1=unpleasant, 7=pleasant  
Which of these best describes how you think you will 
feel today? 
1=depressed, 7=excited 
Which of these best describes how you think you will 
feel today? 
1=relaxed, 7= stressed 
 
  
 
Question Response Options 
How happy do you think you will feel 
today?   
1=not at all happy, 4=moderately, 
7=extremely happy 
How tense do you think you will feel 
today? 
 
1=not at all tense, 4=moderately, 
7=extremely tense 
How enthusiastic do you think you will feel 
today? 
 
1=not at all enthusiastic, 4=moderately, 
7=extremely enthusiastic 
How sad do you think you will feel today? 
 
1=not at all sad, 4=moderately, 
7=extremely sad 
How content do you think you will feel 
today? 
 
1=not at all content, 4=moderately, 
7=extremely content 
How upset do you think you will feel 
today? 
 
1=not at all upset, 4=moderately, 
7=extremely upset 
How excited do you think you will feel 
today? 
 
1=not at all excited, 4=moderately, 
7=extremely excited 
How disappointed do you think you will 
feel today? 
 
1=not at all disappointed, 4=moderately, 
7=extremely disappointed 
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Affect (bedtime assessment): 
 
On the following pages are descriptions of feelings. Rate how you feel right now.   
Question Response Options 
Which of these best describes how you felt in general 
during the day today? 
1=sleepy, 7=active/alert    
Which of these best describes how you felt in general 
during the day today? 
1=unpleasant, 7=pleasant  
Which of these best describes how you felt in general 
during the day today? 
1=depressed, 7=excited 
Which of these best describes how you felt in general 
during the day today? 
1=relaxed, 7= stressed 
 
  
 
Question Response Options 
How happy did you feel today?   1=not at all happy, 4=moderately, 
7=extremely happy 
How tense did you feel today? 
 
1=not at all tense, 4=moderately, 
7=extremely tense 
How enthusiastic did you feel today? 
 
1=not at all enthusiastic, 4=moderately, 
7=extremely enthusiastic 
How sad did you feel today? 
 
1=not at all sad, 4=moderately, 
7=extremely sad 
How content did you feel today? 
 
1=not at all content, 4=moderately, 
7=extremely content 
How upset did you feel today? 
 
1=not at all upset, 4=moderately, 
7=extremely upset 
How excited did you feel today? 
 
1=not at all excited, 4=moderately, 
7=extremely excited 
How disappointed did you feel today? 
 
1=not at all disappointed, 4=moderately, 
7=extremely disappointed 
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Physical Symptoms (beeped assessment): 
 
The next several pages are going to ask questions about your physical activities and 
symptoms since the last assessment. 
 
Question Response Options 
Overall, how have you felt physically since 
the last assessment? 
1=extremely unhealthy, 7=extremely 
healthy 
How much did physical symptoms interfere 
with your daily routine or restrict your 
activities since the last assessment? 
0=not at all, 3=moderately, 6=extremely 
 
Physical Symptoms (bedtime assessment): 
Question Responses 
Which symptoms did you have today? 
(Mark all that apply.) 
Headache 
Backache 
Joint pain 
Dizziness 
Nausea 
Allergy symptoms 
Poor appetite 
Congestion 
Sore throat 
Muscle soreness 
Menstrual pain 
Cold/flu 
Chest pain or tightness 
Constipation or diarrhea 
Trouble breathing 
Heart pounding 
Hot/cold flashes 
Trembling or shaking 
Other symptom 
None of these symptoms 
 
For each selected physical symptom: 
 
Question Responses 
What do you think caused [physical 
symptom]? 
Chronic illness 
Acute illness 
Exercise 
Poor self-care 
Diet or food 
Alcohol 
Aging 
Stress 
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Reproductive issues 
Medication/side effects 
Injury 
Other cause 
How much did it interfere with or restrict 
your daily activities during the day today? 
1 = not at all to 7 = extremely 
How often did you have [physical 
symptom] today? 
1 = rarely to 7 = all day 
Overall, how bad was your [physical 
symptom] today? 
1 = not at all to 7 = extremely 
  246   
 
Sleep Quality (waking assessment): 
 
Question Response Format and Options 
When did you go to bed last night (that is, 
get into bed with the intention of sleeping)? 
separate drop down menus for hours and 
minutes 
How long did it take you to fall asleep last 
night? 
drop down menus with the options less 
than 15 mins, 15-30 mins, 31-60 mins, 
more than 60 mins 
When did you get up this morning? 
 
separate drop down menus for hours and 
minutes 
How many hours of actual sleep did you 
get last night? (this may be different than 
the number of hours you spent in bed) 
 
drop down menu with the options more 
than 7, 6-7 hours, 5-6 hours, less than 5 
hours 
Last night, how many times did you have 
trouble sleeping because you: 
 
Woke up in the middle of the night or early 
morning? 
Had to get up to use the bathroom? 
Could not breathe comfortably? 
Coughed or snored loudly? 
Felt too cold? 
Felt too hot? 
Had bad dreams? 
Had pain? 
Had other thing(s) disturbing sleep? 
 
drop down menu with the options 0 times, 
1 time, 2 times, 3+ times 
Last night, did you take medicine 
(prescribed or over the counter) to help you 
sleep? 
yes/no 
 
Overall, how would you rate your sleep 
quality last night? 
1=very good, 4=very bad 
 
 
  247   
 
Current Activity (beeped assessment): 
Question Responses 
What were you doing when you were 
beeped? 
Chores 
Daily self-care 
Eating/drinking/smoking 
Physical activity 
Recreational 
School related 
Work related 
Where were you doing this activity? Home 
Work 
School 
Other person’s home 
Community center 
Religious center 
Restaurant/bar 
Vehicle 
Outside 
Medical office 
Other 
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All Social Interactions (beeped assessment): 
Question Responses 
Since the last assessment how many social 
interactions have you had? 
0-10 or more 
Overall, how often were these interactions 
pleasant or positive? 
1 = none of the time to 7 = all of the time 
Overall, how often were these interactions 
unpleasant or negative? 
1 = none of the time to 7 = all of the time 
Overall, how often were these interactions 
with a person or people important to you? 
1 = none of the time to 7 = all of the time 
Overall, how often were these interactions 
about topics that were important or 
meaningful to you? 
1 = none of the time to 7 = all of the time 
 
Most Recent Social Interaction (beeped assessment): 
Question Responses 
Who was this interaction with? Spouse/partner 
Children 
Parent 
Sibling 
Other family member 
Acquaintance 
Stranger 
Friend 
Roommate 
Coworker 
Classmate 
Therapist 
Healthcare practitioner 
Other 
Overall, how important are the people or 
person to you? 
1 = not at all to 7 = extremely 
How important or meaningful was this 
interaction to you? 
1 = not at all to 7 = extremely 
Overall, how pleasant or positive was this 
interaction? 
1 = not at all to 7 = extremely 
Overall, how unpleasant or negative was 
this interaction? 
1 = not at all to 7 = extremely 
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Question Responses 
Right now, are you with other people? Yes, no 
Approximately how many people are you 
with now? 
1 person 
2-3 people 
4-10 people 
11-25 people 
More than 25 people 
Who are you with now? Spouse/partner 
Children 
Parent 
Sibling 
Other family member 
Acquaintance 
Stranger 
Friend 
Roommate 
Coworker 
Classmate 
Therapist 
Healthcare practitioner 
Other 
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Functioning (bedtime assessment): 
Question Responses 
Today, how many times did you have 
trouble staying awake while driving, eating 
meals, working, or engaging in social 
activities? 
0 times 
1 time 
2 times 
3 or more 
Today, how many times was it a problem 
for you to keep up enthusiasm to get things 
done? 
0 times 
1 time 
2 times 
3 or more 
 
 
